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Abstract 
This thesis explores whether and how criminal sentencing may provide an effective 
platform to address and remedy some of the structural violence that contribute to Black mass 
incarceration. Introducing race at sentencing represents an attempt to promote, at the back end of 
the criminal process, a discussion that is generally obscured at earlier stages. In critically 
assessing the merits of an explicit discussion about race, this thesis considers the “paradox of 
visibility”: in some contexts, a focus on Blackness operates to disadvantage African Canadians 
interfacing with the criminal justice system; while in other contexts, a refusal to focus on 
Blackness can support the myth of colour blindness and racial neutrality in the criminal justice 
system. Introducing race at the sentencing phase is a challenging, and perhaps even a 
paradoxical, manoeuvre – but one that may also be logical, insofar as we are operating within the 
cruel illogic of white supremacy. 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
 
The criminal justice system is instrumental in manufacturing ‘truths’ and ascribing 
meaning to Black bodies.1Typically, Black bodies are bounded by notions of risk, violence, and 
dangerousness, which are harnessed as justifications for the harsh and degrading treatment 
imposed on Black Canadians2 by the criminal justice system.3Put another way, the criminal 
justice system not only acts upon stereotypical notions about Black Canadians; it is also 
instrumental in their creation. To the extent that Black Canadians are stereotyped as 
“dangerous,” “violent,” and “criminal,” they are disproportionately likely to attract scrutiny and 
harsh treatment from criminal justice actors like police, prosecutors, and judges.4A predictable 
result is the overrepresentation of Black Canadians among criminally accused persons and 
offenders.5That overrepresentation, in turn, serves to validate the unfavourable stereotypes about 
Black Canadians that it helps to produce. In essence, then, the risk that is coded on Black bodies 
becomes self-reinforcing through a negative feedback loop: as more Black people are criminally 
                                                          
1 Barrington Walker, Race on Trial: Black Defendants in Ontario’s Criminal Courts, 1858-1958 (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press for the Osgoode Society for Canadian Legal History, 2010) at 20. 
2 The term African Canadian, and Black, while used interchangeably throughout this document, have different 
historical values. There is no culture in colour, therefore the term Black does not reflect the deep, vibrant histories 
and cultural capital of peoples of African descent. 
3A Collective Impact: Interim report on the inquiry into racial profiling and racial discrimination of Black persons 
by the Toronto Police Service (Toronto: Ontario Human Rights Commission, 2018) at 8; Camisha Sibblis, 
“Expulsion Programs as Colonizing Spaces of Exception” (2014) 21:1 Race, Gender & Class 64. Professor Sibblis 
relies on Sherene Razack’s idea that risk is read on the Body and argues that “Dominant ideology about the black 
body belies how behaviours are interpreted and used to gauge propensity for harmful behaviours and predict future 
harm, particularly because black bodies are believed to be innately savage and violent”. See generally, Sherene 
Razack, Casting out: the eviction of Muslims from western law and politics (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 
2008). 
4 A Collective Impact, supra note 3; Paying the Price: The Human Cost of Racial Profiling (Toronto: Ontario 
Human Rights Commission, 2003); Report of the Commission on Systemic Racism in the Ontario Criminal Justice 
System (Toronto: Queen’s Printer for Ontario, 1995); David M. Tanovich, “The Colour of Justice: Policing Race in 
Canada” (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2006); Akwasi Owusu-Bempah, “Race and policing in historical context: 
Dehumanization and the policing of Black people in the 21st century” (2017) Theoretical Crimin. 21:1 23. 
5 A Collective Impact, supra note 3; David M. Tanovich, “The Charter of Whiteness: Twenty-Five Years of 
Maintaining Racial Injustice in the Canadian Criminal Justice System” (2008) 40 S.C.L.R. (2d) 655; R v Le 2019 
SCC 34 at 90 – 97. [Hereinafter “Le”] 
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punished, more Black people are regarded as deserving of criminal punishment, and vice versa. 
Ample social science data shows the depth and magnitude of this vicious phenomenon.6 
However, despite recognition of the overwhelming evidence of the role that anti-Black racism 
plays in the criminal justice system, and widespread agreement on the need to redress it, Black 
Canadians continue to receive unfair treatment at all stages of the criminal justice process. This 
unfairness is especially acute during the sentencing phase.7  
Criminal sentencing is a form of structural violence that is a salient feature of the 
relationship between Black Canadians and the State.8Indeed, punishment and Black lives have 
long existed in an antagonistic struggle. There is reason to suspect that this relationship found its 
genesis in Black slavery and is currently sustained through the pernicious and racist myths, 
stereotypes and attitudes that code Black bodies as dangerous. Some Canadian scholars assert 
that there is a clear genealogy from Black slavery to the current invidious presuppositions that 
underlie the value and corresponding treatment of Black bodies.9According to Afua Cooper, 
“slavery was the context in which current race relations were created.”10Slavery was justified, in 
part, by the belief that Black people were inferior and dangerous, and hence correctly the subject 
                                                          
6 Toni Williams, “Sentencing Black Offenders in the Ontario Criminal Justice System”, in  Julian V Roberts and 
David P Cole, “Making sense of sentencing” (University of Toronto Press, 1999) 200; Akwasi Owusu-Bempah, 
“Race, Crime, and Criminal Justice in Canada” in Sandra M. Bucerius and Michael Tonry, The Oxford handbook of 
ethnicity, crime, and immigration (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014); Julian V Roberts & Anthony N Doob, 
“Race, Ethnicity, and Criminal Justice in Canada” (1997) 21 Crime & Justice: A Rev of Research 469. 
7 Report of the Commission on Systemic Racism in the Ontario Criminal Justice System, supra note 4 at chapter 8. 
8See generally Clayton Mosher, “The reaction to Black Violent Offenders in Ontario -1892-1961: A Test of the 
Threat Hypothesis” (1999) 14:4 Sociological Forum 635; Shelley Trevethan and Christopher J. Rastin, “A Profile of 
Visible Minority Offenders in the Federal Canadian Correctional System”(2004) Research Branch Correctional 
Service of Canada <http://www.csc-scc.gc.ca/research/r144-eng.shtml#LinkTarget_24738>;Report of the 
Commission on Systemic Racism in the Ontario Criminal Justice System, supra note 4; Julia Sudbury, “Celling 
black bodies: black women in the global prison industrial complex” (2002) 70 feminist review at 59-60; See also 
Toni Williams, supra note 6; Anne-Marie Singh & Jane B. Sprott, “Race Matters: Public Views on Sentencing” 
(2017) 59:3 Can J of Crimin and Crim Justice 285. 
9 See generally Milan Hrabovsky, “The Concept of “BLACKNESS” in Theories of Race” (2013) 22:1 Asian and 
African Studies 65; See also Samuel L. Hart, “Axiology--Theory of Values” (1971) 32:1 Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research 29. 
10 Afua Cooper, “Acts of resistance: Black men and women engage slavery in Upper Canada, 1793-1803” (2007) 
99:1 Ontario History at 7. 
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of formal control.11After slavery was abolished, this belief persisted, and the over-criminalization 
of Black bodies became a conspicuous method of continuing to control and subjugate Black 
people.12This phenomenon remains largely unaltered today.13Current statistics and studies on 
race and criminal sentencing find similar disparities in sentencing outcomes for Black Canadians 
as existed in the decades following abolition.14However, limited scholarly attention has been 
devoted to the impact that anti-Black racism has on the perception of judges tasked with 
sentencing Black bodies.15 There is, however, reason to conclude that some judges engage in 
differential sentencing based on race.16  
Criminological research data suggests that “race-based thinking impacts the public’s 
perception of sentencing appropriateness.”17This research has found that the public generally 
viewed Black offenders as being more dangerous than their similarly situated white counterparts 
and consequently deserving of harsher and longer sentences.18Thus, the iconography of the 
dangerous Black man and its supporting narratives (i.e. so-called biological and social 
predisposition to criminality) remain significant considerations in the sentencing of Black bodies. 
In short, the contemporary legacies of slavery include the sophisticated structural and systemic 
violence levelled against Black bodies by the criminal justice system. Its persistence may 
                                                          
11 Ken Donovan, “Slavery and Freedom in Atlantic Canada’s African Diaspora: Introduction, (2014) XLIII: 1 
Acadiensis at 109. 
12 Robyn Maynard, Policing Black Lives State Violence in Canada from Slavery to the Present (Black Point, NS: 
Fernwood Publishing 2017); Clayton Mosher, supra note 8. 
13 A Collective Impact, supra note 3. 
14 Jamil Malakieh, “Adult and youth correctional statistics in Canada 2016/2017” (2018) Canadian Centre for 
Justice Statistics, <https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/n1/en/pub/85-002-x/2018001/article/54972-
eng.pdf?st=LI8Q630j>;Emerson Douyon, “Ethnocultural Minorities and the Canadian Correctional System” 
(2016) Correctional Service Canada < https://www.csc-scc.gc.ca/about-us/006-4000-eng.shtml>; Shelley 
Trevethan and Christopher J. Rastin, supra note 8; Report of the Commission on Systemic Racism in the Ontario 
Criminal Justice System, supra note 4; Barrington Walker, supra note 1; Clayton Mosher, supra note 8. 
15 Sharyn Roach Anleu, Russell Brewer & Kathy Mack, “Locating the Judge within Sentencing Research” (2017) 
6:2 International Journal for Crime, Justice and Social Democracy 46; Report of the Commission on Systemic 
Racism in the Ontario Criminal Justice System, supra note 4 at Chapter 8. 
16 Ibid.  
17 Anne-Marie Singh & Jane B. Sprott, supra note 8. 
18 Ibid. 
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indicate an unrelenting institutional imperative to oppress and punish Black bodies. Indeed, anti-
Black racism in the Canadian criminal justice system constitutes a longstanding, ongoing crisis 
that must be addressed. In what follows, this thesis will focus on criminal sentencing as both a 
fundamental cause and effect of this crisis and as a possible locus of reform. 
Criminal sentencing is a platform on which pernicious notions of Blackness can either be 
concretized or attenuated. Criminal sentences are not only communicated to the offender, but 
also the wider community.19Depending on how they are constructed, they can either signal 
judicial endorsement of egregious notions of Blackness, or official attempts at denouncing anti-
Blackness. This thesis takes as its starting point the understanding that criminal sentencing 
functions as a form of structural violence that serves to reinforce anti-Black racism in Canada.20 
Criminal sentencing is a central feature of the criminal process and involves a dynamic and 
complex web of legal rules and procedures.21This thesis will investigate how the fundamental 
principle of proportionality, enshrined in section 718.1 of the Criminal Code22, can be calibrated 
to promote fairer sentences for Black offenders. Many scholars who study race and crime have 
sought ways of reducing the over-incarceration of African Canadians by, inter alia, redressing 
the known problem of disproportionate sentencing.23 However, sentencing reform is, at best, a 
partial solution to the problem of the over-criminalization and disproportionate incarceration of 
African Canadians and the broader problem of anti-Black racism.24 
                                                          
19 See generally R.A. Duff, Trials and Punishments (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986). 
20 Akwatu Khenti, “The Canadian war on drugs: Structural violence an unequal treatment of Black Canadians” 
(2014) 25 International Journal of Drug Policy 190; David M. Tanovich, “Race, Sentencing and the "War on Drugs” 
(2004) 22 C.R. (6th) 45; Toni Williams, supra note 6; Sonia N Lawrence & Toni Williams, “Swallowed Up: Drug 
Couriers at the Borders of Canadian Sentencing” (2006) 56:4 UTLJ 285. 
21 Steve Penney et al, Criminal Procedure in Canada, (Markham: Lexis Nexis, 2011) at Chapter 17.  
22 Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c C-46. 
23 Carmela Murdocca, To right historical wrongs: race, gender, and sentencing in Canada (UBC Press, 2013); Toni 
Williams, supra note 6. 
24Kent Roach, "Making Progress on Understanding and Remedying Racial Profiling" (2004) 41:4 Alta L Rev at 903. 
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It is generally accepted that one of the reasons for the over-incarceration of African 
Canadians is the fact that Black offenders often receive disproportionately higher criminal 
penalties compared to their similarly-situated white counterparts; 25and as such, one goal of 
progressive criminal justice reform should be the promotion and facilitation of proportionate 
sentences for African Canadians. Despite this fact, almost no work has been done on the question 
of how we might promote an anti-racist agenda through criminal sentencing. Not simply by 
treating Blackness as something that is implicitly or unconsciously and unjustly, aggravating; but 
by explicitly attending to it as a potential mitigating factor.26In that vein, this thesis will 
investigate an emerging strategy for promoting proportionate sentencing; namely, Cultural 
Impact Assessment Reports (“CIARs”) or Impact of Race and Culture Reports (“IRCARs”)27, 
which are designed to emphasize specific cultural, social, and political mitigating factors that 
ought to be considered in the sentencing of African Canadian offenders.28One aim of this thesis, 
therefore, is to assess whether CIARs/IRCARs can be salutatory in the context of our current 
proportionality-based sentencing regime. It will, therefore, be necessary to take for granted that 
the current Canadian sentencing regime, which is premised on the fundamental principle of 
proportionality and retribution is desirable and can effectively redress the current disparities in 
Black incarceration rates. In essence, sentencing innovation via IRCARs/CIARs will only find 
                                                          
25 Report of the Commission on Systemic Racism in the Ontario Criminal Justice System, supra note 4 at Chapter 8. 
26 There were some scholarly discussions around Blackness, gender and sentencing in the wake of the R v Hamilton, 
2004 CanLII 5549 (ON CA) decision which will be discussed in detail below. However, for the most part these 
articles did not attempt to work out how Blackness could be harnessed to achieve sentencing 
proportionality.[Hereinafter “Hamilton”]  
27 These reports are referred to as CIARs in Nova Scotia and IRCARs in Ontario. 
28 Barbara A. Hudson, “Mitigation for socially deprived Offenders”. In: A. von Hirsch and A. Ashworth, ed., 
Principled Sentencing: Readings on Theory and Policy, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Hart Publishing 1998) at 205-208; Michael 
Plaxton, “Nagging Doubts About the Use of Race (and Racism) in Sentencing”, (2003) 8 C.R. (6th) 299; See 
generally Dale E. Ives, “Inequality, Crime and Sentencing: Borde, Hamilton and the Relevance of Social 
Disadvantage in Canadian Sentencing Law” (2004), 30 Queen's L.J. 114 – 155. 
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success if they can properly interface with our current proportionality-based sentencing 
framework.  
Proportionality is the touchstone principle in Canadian sentencing law.29Penologists 
assert that proportionality has two dimensions: cardinal and ordinal proportionality.30Ordinal 
proportionality suggests that similarly situated offenders should be treated alike and that if we 
compare two offenders, the more blameworthy should attract a more substantial sentence. As 
such, ordinal proportionality encompasses concepts of equality: if there are two comparably 
blameworthy offenders (one white, one Black) and the Black offender receive a more substantial 
sentence, then there is a failure of equality—and a failure of ordinal proportionality. To a large 
extent, ordinal proportionality also assumes retributivism: it regards different levels of 
blameworthiness as a legitimate basis (or perhaps the only legitimate basis) for assigning 
different sentences. The link between proportionality and blameworthiness is made more evident 
still by the concept of cardinal proportionality, which seeks an absolute correspondence between 
wrongdoing and blameworthiness.31  
A fundamental tenet of the retributive project is blameworthiness - specifically the proper 
alignment of blame and desert.32From a retributivist perspective, an offender must be deserving 
of his/her punishment.33Supporters of the theory assert that retribution is theoretically distinct 
from vengeance.34In R v M. (C.A.), the Supreme Court of Canada (“the Court”), in holding that 
retribution is a legitimate principle of Canadian sentencing law, explained that retribution: 
                                                          
29 R v Ipeelee, [2012] 1 SCR 433, 2012 SCC 13 at 37. [Hereinafter “Ipeelee”] 
30 Andrew von Hirsch, “Proportionality in the Philosophy of Punishment: From "Why Punish?" to "How Much?” 
(1990) 1:2 Criminal Law Forum at 282. 
31 Ibid at 282-289. 
32 Ibid at 262-263. 
33 Andrew von Hirsch, ibid at 289-290; R v M. (C.A.), [1996] 1 SCR 500, 1996 CanLII 230 (SCC). 
34 R v M. (C.A.), ibid at 80. 
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is integrally woven into the existing principles of sentencing in Canadian law through the 
fundamental requirement that a sentence imposed be "just and appropriate" under the 
circumstances.  Indeed, it is my profound belief that retribution represents an important 
unifying principle of our penal law by offering an essential conceptual link between the 
attribution of criminal liability and the imposition of criminal sanctions.35  
 
Given the explicit endorsement of the Court, it is axiomatic that the modern institution of 
criminal sentencing is grounded in retributivism. Retributivism in turn, however, rests on the 
fundamental principle of proportionality. The principle of proportionality, as it is conceptualized 
and entrenched in Canadian sentencing law, functions as a restraint mechanism against grossly 
severe punishments or those that are unjustifiably lenient or merciful.36Proportionality 
supposedly aims at temperance and fairness.37For a punishment to be considered fair and just, it 
must be proportionate to the gravity of the offence and moral blameworthiness of the offender. 
An offender ought to be punished fairly - no more or less than he deserves. Fairness thus 
becomes the sine qua non of criminal punishment, as any actual or perceived unfairness 
threatens to throw the entire sentencing apparatus into disrepute.38It is within that vein that this 
thesis aims to address the following question: is the impact of structural violence against Black 
people a relevant factor for consideration in determining a fair and proportionate sentence? 
 This thesis will also discuss the paradox of visibility. In some contexts, a focus on 
Blackness may operate to disadvantage African Canadians interfacing with the criminal justice 
system, while in other contexts, a refusal to focus on Blackness may support the myth of colour 
blindness and racial neutrality in the criminal justice system.39Therefore, introducing race at the 
sentencing phase is a challenging, and perhaps even a paradoxical, manoeuvre – but one that 
                                                          
35 Ibid at 79 (not my emphasis). 
36R v M. (C.A.), ibid at 80; Richard G. Fox, “The Meaning of Proportionality in Sentencing” (1994) 19(3) 
Melbourne U L Rev at 495. 
37 Richard G. Fox, ibid at 492. 
38 Re B.C. Motor Vehicle Act, [1985] 2 SCR 486, 1985 CanLII 81 (SCC) at 129. 
39 See generally Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Critical Race Theory: An Introduction, (New York: NYU Press 
2001). 
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may also be logical, insofar as we are operating within the cruel illogic of white supremacy. The 
erasure of race in sentencing jurisprudence may have arguably provided the catalyst for the 
current CIAR/IRCAR movement.  
Defence lawyers who introduce race and culture at the sentencing phase strive to 
accomplish at the back-end of the criminal process a discussion that is generally obscured at 
earlier stages.40It has only been in recent years that defence lawyers, starting in Nova Scotia, 
have begun to meaningfully address the race and culture of their Black clients before sentencing 
courts.41The trend has spread to Ontario, particularly in the Greater Toronto Area.42There has, 
however, been no clear objective expressed by the Black community, or by defence lawyers, 
with regards to the desired goal or impact to be achieved by the introduction and mobilization of 
Blackness, through the expanded use of IRCARs/CIARs, before sentencing courts. For instance, 
is the goal to edify sentencing judges about the pernicious nature of anti-Black racism in 
Canadian society broadly, and more specifically, within the criminal justice system? Anti-Black 
racism is a notorious fact that has gained a high degree of judicial consensus.43Even the most 
conservative-minded jurist would be deemed unreasonable if he or she were to deny its 
existence. 
However, recognition of a notorious fact does not necessarily lead to the ameliorative 
effect that is desired or expected to follow the facts’ recognition and acknowledgement. 
However, while race talk may only marginally impact sentencing outcomes and redress the 
broader issues of anti-Black racism, it is possible that when race-based evidence is introduced in 
                                                          
40Kent Roach, supra note 24 at 903; David M. Tanovich, “The Further Erasure of Race in Charter Cases” (2006) 38 
C.R. (6th) 84; Julie Jai & Joseph Cheng, “The Invisibility of Race in Section 15: Why Section 15 of the Charter Has 
Not Done More to Promote Racial Equality” (2006) 5 J.L. & Equality 125. 
41 R v “X”, 2014 NSPC 95. 
42 R v Jackson, 2018 ONSC 2527.[Hereinafter “Jackson”] 
43 R v Parks, [1993] O.J. No. 2157, 84 C.C.C. (3d) 353; Le, supra note 5 at 89-97. 
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sentencing, it repositions the centrality of race as a factor for judicial consideration which would 
have otherwise been relegated to the periphery. CIARs/IRCARs ask judges to focus on the 
colour of the accused’s skin so that they will focus on the content of the accused’s character. By 
considering the lived realities of Black people, and that of the specific offender, sentencing 
judges, may learn to disabuse themselves of pervasive Black stereotypes. There will undoubtedly 
be some judicial resistance to this methodological shift given the general discomfort of judges to 
engage in race talk. This resistance contributes to the frustration of litigating and existing in a 
system that is now willing to recognize systemic racism but is still reluctant to recognize racism 
in any one individual case. In some sense, the promise and pitfalls of CIARs/IRCARs parallel 
the promise and pitfalls of criminal procedure cases that have created space for acknowledging 
racism.44For example, in Le the Court may have potentially lifted the judicial embargo on race-
based Charter45 litigation, particularly in Charter cases engaged by police encounters.46 Before 
Le, the Court had only ever marginally engaged in a race-based analysis of the Charter rights 
that were engaged by police conduct.47 
However, while the shift in the Court’s detention analysis introduced by Le is laudable, 
there is the risk that Le may not deliver on its promise. There is the real risk that defence lawyers 
may inadvertently overemphasize race in every case concerning the detention of a racialized 
person. For instance, defence lawyers should eschew a practice that seeks to generate a 
rebuttable presumption that racialized individuals are immediately detained upon contact with 
police. Despite overwhelming evidence of biased policing in racialized communities, such an 
                                                          
44 Danardo S. Jones, Lifting the Judicial Embargo on Race-Based Charter Litigation: A Comment on R. v. Le, (2019) 
67(1&2) C.L.Q. 42. 
45 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, s 7, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the 
Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11 [“the Charter”]. 
46 Le, supra note 5; Supra note 44.  
47 David M. Tanovich, supra note 40; Julie Jai & Joseph Cheng, supra note 40. 
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uncoordinated and unprincipled mobilization of race may serve to diminish the precedential 
potency of Le. Such an approach may also inadvertently and collectively generate a “boy who 
cried wolf” type resistance to race-based s. 9 analyses.48A similar risk may exist regarding the 
routine use of CIARs/IRCARS. Defence lawyers must be strategic in their deployment of race 
during sentencing to avoid indictments for playing the so-called “race card.” However, if 
deployed conscientiously but unapologetically, CIARs/IRCARS may have the potential to 
achieve proportionate sentences for Black Canadians. 
Another potential pitfall is whether CIARs/IRCARs are worth their cost, given the risks 
of individual (re)traumatization and the unintended reinforcement of stereotypes. Therefore, 
defence lawyers must use caution in deciding whether to have one generated. Moreover, to the 
extent that defence lawyers are proposing sentencing reform centred on the use IRCARs/CIARs, 
they must be prepared to acknowledge that these reports are not a “no-cost” or “low-cost” 
proposition for the individuals and communities they seek to benefit. While IRCARs/CIARS are 
potentially transformative documents, their production may be (re)traumatizing for the offenders 
who are asked to reveal and revisit personal experiences with deprivation and trauma and may 
pose the risk of reinforcing stereotypes.  
IRCARs/CIARS can be criticized for attempting to create a lower standard of moral 
blameworthiness premised simply on the mitigating quality of Blackness. Blackness, 
consequently, may be inadvertently transformed into a monolithic reality that subsumes all Black 
Canadians. This packaging of Blackness may serve to create an inaccurate and dangerously 
misleading depiction of the varied and complex meanings ascribed to the Black experience. 
While the introduction of these reports is a welcomed attempt at sentencing reform, defence 
                                                          
48Le, supra note 5; Supra note 44.  
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lawyers must consider whether or how much focus should be placed on an offender’s Blackness. 
In the cases reviewed for this thesis, it was found that defence lawyers, consciously or 
unconsciously, placed a disproportionate amount of emphasis on the links between the offender’s 
Blackness and his or her interactions with the criminal justice system and other structures of 
violence (i.e. education, child welfare). This intense focus may inadvertently operate to reinforce 
or reify certain pernicious notions about the inherent deviance of Black people. Therefore, 
sentencing reform - and especially sentencing reform involving the use of IRCARs/CIARs - can 
only be justified if its positive material impacts on communities and individuals outweigh its 
costs. 
CIARs/IRCARs may reinforce the idea that blameworthiness is a central measure for 
punishment, and hence that retributivism is a legitimate sentencing theory. In this way, 
CIARs/IRCARs seek to operate within our current sentencing paradigm. They do not participate 
in the more radical structural critique that, for example, prison abolitionists suggest we should 
bring to bear on the very institution of criminal justice.49Moreover, in the Canadian social and 
political context, the institution of retributive and proportionality-based punishment cannot be 
disentangled from racism and, therefore, cannot coexist with genuine racial equality.50As Paul 
Butler, writing in the American context, remarked: “criminal law is racist because it is an 
instrument of white supremacy.”51It may be, therefore, reasonable to take the position that any 
effort at sentencing reform that preserves the fundamental principle of proportionality will 
                                                          
49 William Calathes, “Racial capitalism and punishment philosophy and practices: what really stands in the way of 
prison abolition”, (2017) 20:4 Contemporary Justice Review.   
50 Michelle Alexander, “The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in an Age of Colorblindness” (New York: The 
New Press, 2001); Paul Butler, “Racially based jury nullification: black power in the criminal justice system” (1995) 
105:3 Yale L.J. 677. I acknowledge that these sources are American, and, insofar as they are grounded in a 
particular national history, they are not entirely transferrable to the Canadian context – however, the basic insight 
they express is also compelling in the Canadian context. 
51Paul Butler, ibid. 
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ultimately prove inimical to Black liberation and the eradication of systemic anti-Black racism. 
However, CIARs/IRCARs may merit consideration as a “lesser evil option” that strives to work 
within our current paradigm. In some sense, they seek to dismantle the master’s house with the 
master’s tool.52  
There are concerns, however, that a sentencing-focused response may not correctly 
address nor redress the broader problem of institutional racism. Anti-Black racism cannot be 
tackled on one front; instead, it requires an approach that considers the many layers of structural 
violence that inform Black Canadians experience with the State. Indeed, the various institutions 
of structural violence are intricately interwoven and feed each other. It is thereby imprudent to 
attempt to apprehend any one of these institutions separately without acknowledging the 
influence that they may exert on each other. For example, race scholars have discovered that 
there is a causal link between the education system and criminal justice. They have dubbed this 
phenomenon as the ‘school-to-prison pipeline.’53Some scholars have even analogized schools to 
carceral spaces54 – a prelude to what will inevitably befall students that are the victims of 
discriminatory and punitive education practices. Given the relationship between these various 
institutions, it is crucial for scholars analyzing race, particularly Blackness, to eschew adopting a 
myopic lens. It is, however, beyond the scope of this thesis to comprehensively analyze the 
thorny intersecting relationships between these various structures of violence. Although criminal 
sentencing is the primary focus of analysis, this thesis will, where necessary, draw on the 
experiences of Black people in their interactions with other systems of violence.  
                                                          
52 Ibid at 680; See generally Audre Lorde, “The Master’s Tools Will Never Dismantle the Master’s House” (1984) 
in Sister Outsider: Essays and Speeches. Ed. (Berkeley, CA: Crossing Press, 2007) at 110-114. 
53 Abigail Tsionne Salole & Zakaria Abdulle, “Quick to Punish: An examination of the school to prison pipeline for 
marginalized youth” (2015) 72/73 Canadian Review of Social Policy 125. 
54 See generally Camisha Sibblis, supra note 3. 
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Section A: Roadmap 
 
This thesis aims to explore how much consideration should be accorded to Blackness in 
the sentencing of Black offenders. In that vein, if Blackness is accepted as a crucial contextual 
factor for consideration, what impact should it have on sentence outcomes? Importantly, can 
proportionality be achieved through the acknowledgment of anti-Blackness? The thesis will also 
demonstrate how conflicting notions of Blackness may impact sentencing determinations. It will 
argue that when Blackness is over-emphasized at sentencing, defence lawyers risk compounding 
already entrenched notions of anti-Blackness in the criminal justice system. Indeed, an 
unprincipled mobilization of Blackness may operate as an affront to the dignity of Black 
Canadians. There is the reason, however, to hope that an increase in race talk at sentencing may 
result in the reduction of Black over-incarceration. This approach raises an important question, 
namely: whether criminal sentencing reform can be achieved through the extensive use of 
IRCARs/CIARs. Put another way, does criminal sentencing provide an effective platform to 
address and remedy anti-Black racism and other forms of structural violence that contribute to 
Black mass incarceration?  
This thesis will be divided into four (4) chapters. Chapter one (1) has provided a brief 
overview of the thesis. Chapter two (2) will broadly discuss anti-Black racism in the criminal 
justice system. It will specifically explore how over-policing and other racially biased policing 
strategies inexorably leads to the over-imprisonment of Black Canadians. Chapter two (2) will 
also provide a brief historical discussion of anti-Black racism in Canada. The discussion will 
highlight the role that Canada played in the slave trade and its treatment of Black Canadians 
post-slavery. Chapter three (3) will undertake a discussion of sentencing theory, both from a 
philosophical standpoint and with a focus on the principles enshrined within our current 
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sentencing regime. It will also provide a case law review of sentencing decisions that have 
considered race as a mitigating factor in the sentencing. Lastly, chapter four (4) will conduct a 
critical analysis of the current IRCAR/CIAR movement. It will explore whether sentencing 
reform can be achieved through the extensive use of IRCARs/CIARs. Moreover, it will offer a 
prescriptive account of how our awareness of pervasive anti-Black racism ought to be 
incorporated into our current sentencing regime. It will propose a sentencing framework that 
promotes proportionate sentencing while attending to how individual responsibility and 
sentencing fairness should be assessed in light of the cultural legacies and historical oppressions 
of Black bodies/offenders. 
Section B: Methodology 
 
This thesis will utilize a mix-methodological approach by analyzing recent sentencing 
cases from Nova Scotia and Ontario that considered the race and culture of Black offenders in 
the formulation of a fit and proportionate sentence. Some of these cases utilized CIARs/IRCARs, 
while others referred to the seminal cases on Blackness and sentencing, for example, R v X in 
Nova Scotia and Jackson in Ontario.55These cases will be reviewed to provide a critical doctrinal 
analysis of the reliance on CIARs/IRCARs within our current sentencing regime. This review 
will be done through the lens of critical race theory (“CRT”) and against the backdrop of 
penological theory. This thesis will also incorporate some of the critical scholarship on the policy 
and scholarly debates about race and sentencing. 
                                                          
55R v “X”, supra note 41; Jackson, supra note 42. 
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The thesis will draw on qualitative research data generated from semi-structured 
interviews with defence lawyers and Black ex-offenders.56The former group consisted of both 
male and female Black ex-offenders who are currently not entangled in the criminal justice 
system. The ex-offenders ranged in age from early thirties to late forties.57They were mainly 
Canadian citizens of Jamaican ancestry who were either under-employed or unemployed and did 
not attend a post-secondary institution. These participants were largely recruited through 
community contacts, and by word of mouth. I contacted friends and family members that I knew 
had interactions with the criminal justice system, and sometimes, they provided me with other 
potential participants.  
Each participant was contacted by telephone to discuss availabilities and the scope of the 
project and their involvement. All of the ex-offender participants were interviewed over the 
telephone, mainly for convenience, but also because many were located in other cities. The 
interviews ranged in duration from fifteen (15) minutes to over one and half (1.5) hours. I 
recorded and digitally stored all the interviews. A prepared script was utilized. However, as the 
interview unfolded necessary adjustments were made, for example utilizing probing questions 
and permitting the participants to “go off script” when appropriate or would interfere with their 
narrative if abruptly redirected. Nine (9) ex-offender participants were interviewed. Table one 
provides details on these participants’ names, interview dates, age and gender and offence 
categories.  
 
 
                                                          
56 All interviews were recorded and digitally stored. I also took hand written notes contemporaneously with the 
interviews. I did, not, however, transcribe the recordings of the interviews. The Jamaican interviewees’ interview 
data (which were provided in Jamaican Patois) was translated by me (I am a native Jamaican patois speaker). I have 
italicized those quotes that I have translated, and those that are direct quotes are marked by quotation marks.   
57 One participant was 63 years old. 
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Table 1 
Name  Interview Date Age, Gender Offence(s) 
1. S.L April 2, 2019 30, Female Drugs and firearm 
2. A.W April 2, 2019 48, Male Drugs 
3. J. M April 2, 2019 39, Female Assault 
4. M.B April 4, 2019 35, Male Drugs  
5. M.W April 3, 2019 38, Male Mischief  
6. O.J April 3, 2019 43, Male Drugs 
7. C.L April 4, 2019 63, Male Assault 
8. S.R April 5, 2019 32, Female Firearm 
9. E.B April 15, 2019 34, Male Robbery with Firearm 
 
The second group comprised both male and female members of the criminal defence bar. 
All of the defence lawyer participants are my colleagues and friends. I emailed each potential 
participant and explained the scope of the project and their involvement. We would agree on a 
time and date for the interview, which generally lasted between fifteen (15) minutes and thirty 
(30) minutes. Most of the interviews were conducted in person, mainly because I worked in close 
proximity to many of the participants. A few of the interviews were done by telephone. These 
interviews were recorded and digitally stored. For the interviews conducted in person, I took 
written notes. Table two below provides details on these participants’ names, interview dates, 
gender and race.  
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Table 2 
Name   Interview date/Method Gender/Race 
1. H.D April 17, 2019 – Telephone Female/white 
2. J.T April 4, 2019 – Telephone  Female/white 
3. D.F March 28, 2019 – In person Female/white 
4. G.S March 28, 2019 – In person  Female/Arab 
5. S.H July 30, 2019 – Telephone  Female/Black 
6. L.L March 27, 2019 – Telephone  Female/Black 
7. T.L March 29, 2019 – In person  Male/white 
8. A.B March 28, 2019 – In person  Female/white 
9. G.C March 28, 2019 – Telephone  Male/Black 
 
As mentioned above, some of the interviews were conducted in person, but for 
convenience, the majority were done over the telephone. The participants were asked similar 
open-ended questions that aimed to explore the interplay between race, culture and social 
deprivation/disadvantage and what weight, if any, from the participants’ perspective should be 
accorded to these factors in the sentencing of Black bodies.58The study aimed to elicit 
commentary on how race-based myths operate and are reproduced in the area of criminal justice, 
particularly in the sentencing arena. The study’s findings, which will be discussed in greater 
detail, revealed unexpected, albeit informative, results about the mobilization of Blackness in the 
sentencing of Black offenders.  
                                                          
58 Please find interview protocols in appendix A. 
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The interview questions invited the participants to offer their thoughts, broadly, on the 
criminal justice system and, more specifically, on how it impacts African-Canadians.  
Admittedly, the questions were constructed to provoke an emotive response.59Race talk does 
that. The questions were designed to create discomfort - not in the sense of traumatizing or 
instilling fear in the participants - but by problematizing well-settled notions of racial 
assignments and attributions.60The study aimed to elicit an honest and emotive response from the 
participants that might encourage and contribute to an attitudinal and cultural shift in how we 
understand Blackness and punishment. For example, consider this classic myth/stereotype: 
Blacks are overrepresented in prisons because of their inherent desire to commit crimes. The 
interviewees were asked to share their opinion on the so-called link between Blackness and 
criminality - a link that many scholars consider to be the product of junk science and borne out 
anti-Black racism. However, some of the ex-offender interviewees expressed that there may be a 
link between race and crime. One female ex-offender remarked that all people engage in crime, 
but Black people do more shootings and robberies, but they get more blame because of racism.61  
Notwithstanding the size of the study62, the results provided an informative and rich 
illustration of the diverging views that defence lawyers and Black offenders have about the 
introduction of Blackness in sentencing. The participants offered invaluable insights about what 
considerations should or ought to be accorded to Blackness in the sentencing arena. While the 
study was too small in scope to generate useable statistical data, the responses it generates serve 
                                                          
59 I was granted ethics approval from the York University’s Office of research Ethics. Certificate #: STU 2019-022. 
Approval Period: 03/26/19-03/26/20 
60 See generally Halleh Ghorashi, “When the Boundaries are Blurred: The Significance of Feminist Methods in 
Research” (2005) 12:3 European Journal of Women’s 363; Susanne Bahn & Pamela Weatherill, “Qualitative social 
research: a risky business when it comes to collecting ‘sensitive’ data” (2012) 13:1 Qualitative Research 19; 
Margaret Hunter, “Rethinking Epistemology, Methodology and Racism: Or, Is White Sociology Really Dead?” 
(2002) 5: 2 Race and Society 119.  
61 S.L. is a 30-year-old Black Canadian female.  
62 I interviewed in total eight (8) defence lawyers and 8 ex-offenders.  
19 
 
to provide texture and specificity to the problem of Black over-incarceration and anti-Black bias 
in criminal sentencing. Importantly, it may also provide some of the data that scholars currently 
lack on whether or when it is appropriate to mobilize Blackness at the sentencing phase. This 
data, particularly the findings from the ex-offender cohort, represents the voice of those people 
who theoretically stand to benefit from the mobilization of race at sentencing. In analyzing the 
data, I listened to the recordings and reviewed my notes. I chose quotes that believed were 
germane to the topics that were under investigation, and that helped to provide context and 
support for my assertions.  
CRT provides the most appropriate theoretical perspective from which to analyze the 
issues taken up in this thesis. It found its genesis in legal scholarship but has since spread to 
other disciplines.  The theory aims to provide insights on, and “transforming the relationship 
among race, racism and power.”63CRT scholars (“Crits”) posit that racism is deeply entrenched 
within society and is common and ordinary and therefore presents a significant challenge to 
cure.64 Crits challenge the foundations of the liberal order that espouses notions of meritocracy. 
They reject notions of colour-blind equality that seek to achieve formal equality. According to 
Crits, society operates in a hierarchical fashion, which they term, white-over-colour ascendancy. 
This hierarchy serves two functions, namely: psychic and material.65This idea is referred to as 
interest convergence or material determinism. Crits argue that “because racism advances the 
interests of both white elites (materially) and working-class people (psychically), large segments 
of society have little incentive to eradicate it.”66In a sense, racism serves to undergird white 
supremacy and promote the interests of white people, notwithstanding their class.  
                                                          
63Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, supra note 39 at 2. 
64Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, supra note 39 at 7. 
65Ibid. 
66Ibid. 
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Another tenet of CRT is the social construction thesis, which holds that “race and races 
are products of social thought and relations. Not objective, inherent, or fixed, they correspond to 
no biological or genetic reality: rather, races are categories that society invents, manipulates, or 
retires when convenient”.67Races are also subject to differential racialization. This process 
occurs when “dominant society racializes different minority groups at different times in response 
to shifting needs.”68Differential racialization is closely related to “the notion of intersectionality 
and anti-essentialism. No person has a simple, easily stated, and unitary identity”.69An 
intersectional approach considers the multiple sites of oppression that frame and informs the 
Black experience. It considers that anti-Black racism may comprise a convergence of 
vulnerabilities that cannot be apprehended singularly but must be understood at their intersecting 
points. In this vein, it rejects essentialist notions of Blackness that seek to reduce or minimize the 
Black experience as a universal, unitary phenomenon. 
A unique feature of CRT is the voice of colour.70It rejects notions of neutrality in legal 
scholarship and advocates for the inclusion of racialized voices in knowledge generation. The 
voice of colour presupposes that Black scholars have inherent standing to discuss issues related 
to Blackness on account of their lived experiences. Moreover, 
the voice-of-colour thesis holds that because of their different histories and experiences 
with oppression black, Indian, Asian, and Latino/a writers and thinkers may be able to 
communicate to their white counterparts matters that the whites are unlikely to know. 
Minority status, in other words, brings with it a presumed competence to speak about race 
and racism. 71  
 
                                                          
67Ibid. 
68Ibid at 8. 
69Ibid at 8-9. 
70 Alex M. Johnson, Jr. “Defending the Use of Narrative and Giving Content to the Voice of Color: Rejecting the 
Imposition of Process Theory in Legal Scholarship” (1994) 79 Iowa L. Rev. 803. 
71Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, supra note 39 at 9. 
21 
 
Frances et al. discuss the challenges faced by racialized and indigenous scholars in the 
Academy.72An important issue that may not have been explicitly discussed, but deserves 
consideration, is that specific knowledge is not being produced by those who have lived the 
experience. The authors found in their study that racialized scholars are not given the same 
opportunities as their white counterparts to engage/participate in this knowledge generation 
economy.73Critical race scholarship may provide a platform from which racialized scholars can 
disrupt the knowledge production enterprise.74  
As a Black male researcher studying the impacts of anti-Black racial injustice in the 
criminal justice system, it is critical to acknowledge my own social location, and some of the 
experiences that animate and ground me. While I do not believe that an exhaustive exposition of 
my positionalities, identities, and social location, and the role they played in the construction of 
my research agenda, is warranted. I do, however, agree with critical race scholars that it is vital 
for “Black and Brown writers to recount their own experiences with racism and the legal system 
and to apply their own unique perspectives to assess law’s master narratives.”75However, the 
researcher’s positionalities, identities, and social location, if not properly constrained, 
acknowledged or accounted for may lead to data that reinforces the researcher’s presuppositions 
about the topic under investigation. The study may also become vulnerable to criticism that it 
was designed to produce a particular end.  Thus, self-reflexivity may have its drawbacks when 
“researchers who adopt a reflexive approach risk privileging excessive self-analysis and 
deconstructions at the expense of focusing on the research participants and developing 
                                                          
72 Frances Henry, et al, The Equity Myth: Racialization and Indigeneity at Canadian Universities (UBC Press, 
2017). 
73 Ibid. 
74Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, supra note 39 at 9. 
75Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, supra note 39 at 9.   
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understanding.”76Despite this caution, self-reflexivity and an acknowledgement of one’s social 
location and positionalities can facilitate the production of, what some scholars describe as 
“transformative knowledge.”77  
Like other CRT scholars, I “tell [my] stories of anti-Black racism as a way of healing and 
performing [my] anti-oppressive practice that prompts action for social justice.”78This 
methodological approach liberates the researcher from the shackles of positivism and 
objectivity.79Indeed, feminist methodology encourages this emancipatory approach to knowledge 
production by challenging the notion of universalism and the monopolization of the knowledge 
production process.80The performance of the dispassionate researcher should be eschewed and 
replaced by critical self-reflexivity.81Knowledge production, in this sense, becomes a symbiotic 
enterprise which is critical in generating knowledge that may be used to combat racial injustice. 
This approach may also shed light on taken for granted assumptions about the population or 
issue under investigation.82It promotes the acknowledgment of power dynamics and ensures that 
the participant’s agency is not undermined.83The extractive process, thus, becomes a joint and 
equitable exercise - not an exploitative one. Researchers, however, must ensure that they “avoid 
imposing meaning rather than constructing meaning through negotiation with research 
                                                          
76 Karen Lumsden, “‘You Are What You Research’: Researcher Partisanship and the Sociology of the ‘Underdog’ ” 
(2012) 13:1 Qualitative Research at 4. 
77Joan M. Anderson, “Toward a Post-Colonial Feminist Methodology in Nursing Research: Exploring the 
Convergence of Post-Colonial and Black Feminist Scholarship” (2002) 9 (3) Nurse Researcher at 12. 
78Martha Kuwee Kumsa, Magnus Mfoafo-M'Carthy, Funke Oba & Sadia Gaasim, “The Contours of Anti-Black 
Racism: Engaging Anti-Oppression from Embodied Spaces” (2014) 1:1 The Journal of Critical Anti-Oppressive 
Social Inquiry at 24.  
79Margaret Hunter, supra note 57 at 123. 
80 Marjorie L. DeVault, “Talking Back to Sociology: Distinctive Contributions of Feminist Methodology” (1996) 
22:1 Annual Review of Sociology 29; Joan M. Anderson, supra note 74. 
81 Halleh Ghorashi, supra note 57. 
82 Marjorie L. DeVault, supra note 77 at 33. 
83 Ibid. 
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participants.”84It is within this spirit that I have chosen to introduce my own experiences with 
criminal justice.  
Section C: Personal Narrative (Between the Criminal Justice System and Me) 
 
For most of my teenage and young adult life, I was entangled in the criminal justice 
system. This reality, however, was a common experience for many of the young Black men in 
the urban Toronto and Ottawa neighbourhoods, where I spent much of my teenage and young 
adult life. The normalcy of this legal entanglement also extended to our parents, mainly our poor 
single Black mothers. It was poor single Black mothers, in support of their young Black sons, 
that filled the Eglin Street courthouse in Ottawa, 311 Jarvis youth court in Toronto, and various 
other adult courthouses across the Greater Toronto Area (GTA). My mother was a frequent, 
albeit reluctant and exasperated supporter of my older brother and me. She had to learn about the 
obligations of a bail surety and other aspects of the criminal process. Many times, she and other 
close family members would reluctantly have to disclose embarrassing personal and financial 
information in order to secure our release. In essence, my entanglement in the criminal justice 
system inadvertently exposed my family members to criminal justice. Thus, my criminal charge 
and ultimate punishment became my mother’s charge and punishment.   
When I was a young child living in my birth country of Jamaica, my mother and uncle told 
me that one day, I would become a lawyer - mainly because of my loquacious personality. This 
prediction was long before any of us knew what a lawyer was or did – except for what we would 
have viewed on television. My first contact with a ‘real’ lawyer came with my first criminal 
charge. This was my mother’s first contact with a ‘real’ lawyer, as well. For me, however, 
contact with the criminal justice system meant street credibility. Over the years, I would be 
                                                          
84Bev Gatenby & Maria Humphries, “Feminist Participatory Action Research: Methodological and ethical issues” 
(2000) 23:1 Women’s Studies International Forum at 100. 
24 
 
criminally charged several other times and would often retain different lawyers, but one thing 
remained constant: most of them cared little about my circumstances. I was reminded of this by a 
criminal defence lawyer that I had retained to act for me on one of my criminal cases. Due to the 
obvious financial difficulties a person involved in the drug trade would experience following an 
arrest and charge (heightened police surveillance, etc.), I was unable to pay him the amount we 
had agreed on. I asked him for some time to pay, and he responded by telling me that “he didn't 
care if I had to sell a pound of crack to pay his fee.” I never truly trusted any of my lawyers, but 
there was an understanding that if I paid their fee, I might have a chance of staying out of jail. 
However, lawyers were not the only questionable actors that I encountered in the criminal 
justice system. The police dominated my fears. There was one simple understanding in the 
streets: police officers hate Black people and vice-versa. That pretty much summed up race 
relations from the perspective of an over-charged and racially profiled Black man. I never 
questioned this reality; I just did my best to avoid the police, even in situations when I was doing 
nothing illegal. I had learned the hard way that wearing black skin was illegal.  I was arrested 
and detained so many times, and for so many different reasons, often spurious, that I lost count. 
Many of those arrests never amounted to a charge – just a reminder; it would seem that I was 
being watched.  
The above narrative, however, is not an indictment of all criminal lawyers or police 
officers; instead, it is a description of what many Black men live with every day. I decided to 
attend law school because I disliked the way lawyers and the police treated members of my 
community and me. During law school, I was often implored by friends, colleagues and family 
members to practice criminal law. They assumed that I would make an excellent criminal lawyer 
because I was once dubbed a criminal. However, I queried if that was what the criminal justice 
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system required for reform: an influx of reformed Black criminals? Indeed, I have a unique 
appreciation of the frustration that many young Black men are facing from an unfair criminal 
justice system. Many of my friends and some of my family members are still caught up in this 
system, and the police pump new blood, in the form of young Black men, into this system daily. 
Thus, I would have enough work to keep me busy for a long time. My problem is that I am 
sometimes morally conflicted about profiting from this onslaught. Call me naive, but I will not 
directly or indirectly send a young Black man to sell a pound of crack to pay my fees.   
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Chapter Two: Blackness and Criminal Justice  
 
Section A: Anti-Blackness (A Brief Historical Review) 
 
The institution of criminal sentencing and the broader criminal justice system is a form of 
structural violence that continues to deprive Black people of their liberty and dignity.85At these 
sites, virulent stereotypes and attitudes about Blackness are reinforced and reified. There is, 
however, a clear genealogy between these contemporary moments of racial injustice and Black 
slavery.86The Black experience in Canada is a complex and often contradictory mosaic of 
moments of extreme intolerance – for example, Black slavery87, institutional racism88, and 
cultural and socio-economic disintegration – to periods where tolerance is official State 
policy.89The latter, however, tends to form the basis of the contemporary national narrative, 
which serves to minimize, or in some instances erase Canada’s history and current expressions of 
virulent anti-Black racism.90For example, despite historical and archival evidence that documents 
Canada’s involvement in the trans-Atlantic slave trade91, “the study of slavery is not a significant 
                                                          
85 Akwatu Khenti, supra note 20 at 190; Akwasi Owusu-Bempah, supra note 6; Paying the Price, supra note 4; A 
Collective Impact, supra note 3; Report of the Commission on Systemic Racism in the Ontario Criminal Justice, 
Supra note 4. 
86 Afua Cooper, supra note 10.  
87William Renwick Riddell, Slave in Canada (Washington: Association for the Study of Negro Life and History, 
1920); Frank Mackey, Done with slavery: the Black fact in Montreal, 1760-1840, (McGill-Queen's University Press, 
2010); Robyn Maynard, supra note 12; Ken Donovan, “Female Slaves as Sexual Victims in Île Royale,” (2014) 43:1 
Acadiensis: Journal of the History of the Atlantic Region 147; Ken Donovan, “Slaves and Their Owners in Ile 
Royale, 1713-1760” (1995) 25:1 Acadiensis: Journal of the History of the Atlantic Region 3.  
88 Constance Backhouse, Colour-Coded: A Legal History of Racism in Canada, 1900--1950 (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press for the Osgoode Society for Canadian Legal History, 1999); Barrington Walker, supra note 1; 
Clayton Mosher, supra note 8. 
89Charter at section 27. 
90 Ken Donovan, supra note 11 at 110. 
91 Ken Donovan, ibid; Catherine M.A. Cottreau-Robins, “Searching for the Enslaved in Nova Scotia’s Loyalist 
Landscape” (2014) 43:1 Acadiensis: Journal of the History of the Atlantic Region 125; Ken Donovan, supra note 
84; Ken Donovan, Supra note 11; “Motion commemorating 200th anniversary of the Abolition of the Slave Trade 
Act, 1807” (2007) 99:1 Ontario History, p. IV. Gale Academic OneFile Select, 
http://link.galegroup.com/apps/doc/A166272061/EAIM?u=yorku_main&sid=EAIM&xid=f2e367e7. Accessed 10 
Aug. 2019. 
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part of the Canadian historical narrative.”92The slave historiography has instead been skewed to 
highlight Canada’s involvement in emancipatory undertakings such as the Underground Railroad 
and Canada’s granting of asylum to fugitive Black Loyalists during the American Revolutionary 
War and War of 1812.93 
 As Ken Donovan observes, “the study of slavery in Canada goes against the dominant 
image of Canada as a land of freedom,” individual rights, multiculturalism and belonging.94 
Consequently, Canada’s slave history is supplanted and obscured by the recent introduction of 
‘multiculturalism’ as official state policy.95However, while the institution of slavery operated on 
a smaller scale in Canada, than it did in the other regions of the Black slave world, it nonetheless 
existed and formed a significant part of Canadian history.96Moreover, “slavery in the New 
World, in addition to being an economic and labour arrangement, was also a racialized system.97 
Indeed, the social dimensions of Black slavery were not only instrumental in manufacturing the 
justifications for the practice’s introduction and longevity, but also its legacies. As historian Afua 
Cooper aptly remarked, “slavery was the context in which current race relations were created.”98 
Slave historian, Kenneth Morgan, also asserted that “the racial prejudice associated with Black 
slavery has had an enduring impact on modern life.”99Slavery produced, reproduced and 
reinforced a definitional frame that significantly contributed to the pernicious presuppositions 
                                                          
92 Ken Donovan, supra note 11 at 110. 
93 Ibid at 110. 
94 Ibid. 
95 Charter at section 27. 
96 Ken Donovan, supra note 11 at 110; William Renwick Riddell, supra note 84; Kenneth Morgan, A short history 
of Transatlantic Slavery (London: I.B. Tauris & CO. Ltd, 2016). 
97 See generally Kenneth Morgan, ibid. 
98 Afua Cooper, supra note 10. 
99 Kenneth Morgan, supra note 93 at 6. 
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underlying the value of Blackness and Black bodies.100It was also instrumental in assigning value 
to Black bodies – both aesthetic and financial. Black bodies were deemed to be inferior, 
heathenistic, subhuman, sexually promiscuous, unpleasant, violent, unintelligent, and 
depraved.101 These labels were instrumental in constructing the justificatory basis for Black 
enslavement.102 These moral, intellectual, physical and psychological deficiencies provided the 
pretext that undergirded the institution of Black enslavement and its current 
manifestations/legacies.103 
Section B: Anti-Blackness (Post-Slavery) 
 
Long gone are the days of slavery, but its contemporary legacies are equally as virulent 
and destructive to the bodies of Black Canadians.  Generations of Black bodies have experienced 
the sting and indignities of the state’s whip - figuratively and literally.104The Black body is at 
once a site of immense historical and contemporaneous State violence and trauma. This violence 
is given expression through a variety of different, interrelated methods and institutions (i.e. 
criminal justice, child welfare, policing, education, etc.).105The need to control and govern Black 
bodies stretches back to slavery and has continued to the present day.106The abolition of slavery 
                                                          
100 See generally Milan Hrabovsky, supra note 9; See also Samuel L. Hart, supra note 9; Kenneth Morgan, A short 
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in the British colonies, including Canada, was only the end of institutional chattel slavery, which 
was replaced by even more invidious forms of white supremacy.107 The period between slavery 
and the modern Black experience is marked by moments of extraordinary structural violence, 
some that were legislated and others that persisted through the attitudes of white Canadians about 
Blackness.108Constance Backhouse found in her study that the Ku Klux Klan, a white 
supremacist group that was initially formed in the United States, took root in communities across 
parts of southern Ontario and disseminated their hate-filled message about race-mixing - an 
attitude that was shared in large part by many Canadians.109Studies also found that around that 
time, anti-Blackness suffused the entire criminal justice system.110Over time, the methods of 
control have included slave patrols111, weaponized rape112, anti-miscegenation policies113, 
segregation114, intimidation115, restrictive immigration policies116, and other destructive and 
insidious measures of denying Black peoples full citizenship and inclusion within Canadian 
society. 
Both Michelle Alexander, writing in the American context, and Robyn Maynard writing 
in the Canadian context, agree that post-slavery, the over-criminalization of Black Canadians 
became a conspicuous method of controlling Black bodies.117In terms of punishment, Mosher 
argues that the institution of criminal sentencing was a method that was used following slavery 
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to control the Black threat to white Canada.118For example, the study found that in Ontario 
between 1892-1961, anti-Black stereotypes and attitudes were instrumental in sentencing 
outcomes.119In fact, during that period, Black Canadians were disproportionately incarcerated 
and subjected to harsher punishment compared to their white counterparts.120The disparity in 
sentencing was mainly premised on prevailing notions of Black people’s propensity for 
criminality and the need to control the purported threat that they posed to the social integrity of 
Canada.121There is no recent evidence to suggest that current sentencing disparities are a reaction 
to the same threat. However, and as will be discussed below in more detail, the association of 
Blackness with criminality continues to increase the already disproportionate levels at which 
African Canadians are arrested, prosecuted and imprisoned compared to their similarly situated 
white counterparts.122 
Section C: Anti-Black Racism, and Blackness (Some Definitional Musings)  
 
Scholars assert that “the term anti-Black racism is intriguing. Its meaning is multi-layered 
and configured differently, it could mean several things”.123Indeed, even Blackness, a concept 
that is used extensively in this thesis, is “hotly contested.”124There is no monolithic notion of 
Blackness, nor does there exist a prototypical Black person that embodies all the traits and 
idiosyncrasies of all Black Canadians. There is an inherent danger in packaging Blackness as a 
singular experience.  It is, however, challenging to delineate the epistemological, axiological and 
ontological contours of Blackness and anti-Black racism. The immediate goal of this thesis is not 
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to engage in a debate about semantics and definitions but rather to discuss the impacts of 
structural violence that are a consequence of anti-Black racism. The practical realities of this 
form of structural violence are hard to deny. As Stephen Lewis aptly stated in his report: 
it is Blacks who are being shot, it is Black youth that is unemployed in excessive 
numbers, it is Black students who are being inappropriately streamed in schools, it is 
Black kids who are disproportionately dropping out, it is housing communities with large 
concentrations of Black residents where the sense of vulnerability and disadvantage is 
most acute, it is Black employees, professional and non-professional, on whom the doors 
of upward equity slam shut. Just as the soothing balm of ‘multiculturalism’ cannot mask 
racism, so racism cannot mask its primary target.125 
For our purposes, anti-Black racism is best understood as a convergence of multiple sources of 
oppression that finds its genesis in Black slavery. It is crucial to reject a unitary understanding of 
Blackness. CRT scholars, most notably Kimberle Crenshaw, instead adopt an intersectional 
framework that analyzes how multiple sources of oppression can “intersect” to create an axis of 
vulnerability that is more than just the sum of its parts. Hence, it is not enough for us to 
sequentially analyze each locus of oppression; rather, the intersection must be apprehended on its 
own terms.126Thus, being a socially constructed concept, Blackness is experienced, understood, 
created and manipulated in various ways.127Blackness is a multi-dimensional and complex idea 
that is not easily understood. It exists and is given meaning at various intersections of social life.  
Blackness in post-slave societies may be understood differently than Blackness in societies that 
did not experience the trans-Atlantic slave trade. There is also an important distinction between 
Blackness, as it is experienced in white-dominated societies, compared to how it is experienced 
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in predominately Black societies. When asked if there is an inherent linkage between crime and 
Blackness, one ex-offender remarked that there is nothing good about Black in the eyes of white 
people.128In this sense, Blackness is understood as imposing a burden and not as a source of 
pride, which is contrary to my own experiences of Blackness in my birth country of Jamaica.  
Jamaica is a post-slavery country that is mainly populated by the descendants of Black 
African slaves. In Jamaica, we were taught to be proud of our Blackness and enculturated to 
appreciate the sacrifices and triumphs of our ancestors who resisted white subjugation. This 
culture of resistance is the hallmark of ‘Jamaicanness’ and in turn, informs my understanding of 
Blackness. My understanding of Blackness shifted when I immigrated to Canada. In Canada, I 
was primarily introduced to topics that highlighted Black inferiority, both historically and 
contemporaneously. I was taught that my descendants were slaves that lived in abject servitude 
until finally being emancipated through the benevolence of white legislators. The misery did not 
stop with the abolition of slavery. I was taught that post-slavery Black Canadians were denied all 
the rights of full citizenship and relegated to the margins of society. Indeed, notions of Blackness 
in Canada were in contradistinction to my experience of Blackness in Jamaica.  William Oliver 
describes this phenomenon as cultural racism. He argues that:  
a significant example of cultural racism as a social and institutional practice and an 
example of structural violence involves the conspicuous absence in most elementary and 
high school social studies curricula of a substantive discussion of the contributions of 
Africans and African Americans to the development of human civilization (Ben-
Jochannan, 1991). Given the importance of history and social studies as a means by 
which a society introduces its young people to its celebration story, the conspicuous 
absence of African Americans in history textbooks reinforces and promotes racist 
ideology and racial stereotypes.129  
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Indeed, anti-Black racism has ravaged Black communities in post-slavery countries where Black 
people are a racial minority, like Canada. While the term Blackness is being used as a catch-all 
for the commonalities that link the diverse experiences of Black Canadians - those 
commonalities are informed by Canada’s legacy as a participant in slavery, which resulted in the 
current sophisticated structural and systemic abuse in many areas of social life. Today, Black 
Canadians experience exclusion, discrimination and oppression –largely in the form of anti-
Black racism and its intersected realities violence, socio-economic status, personal beliefs, etc. 
This reconstituted prejudice is brought into sharp relief in the administration of the criminal 
justice system.  
Section D: Anti-Black Racism and Criminal Justice 
 
Anti-Black racism not only informs but is an accurate predictor of how Black Canadians 
will interface with the criminal justice system. There is a clear genealogy from the most explicit 
and violent forms of anti-Black racism to current expressions of structural violence against Black 
Canadians. Black Canadians still experience significant disadvantage and structurally inflicted 
violence, but in terms that have been sanitized and taken out of public view. This new subtler 
form of anti-Black racism is more difficult to combat insofar as it is now an indistinguishable 
feature of society’s institutions, such as the criminal justice system.130However, despite the 
subtleness of current expressions of anti-Black racism, there exists an intractable relationship 
between Blackness and crime that continues to inform current understandings of Black 
criminality. Scholars who study race and crime generally agree that our system of criminal 
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justice is inherently biased and hostile towards racialized people.131Indeed, this bias has suffused 
the entire criminal justice system and leads to the over-incarceration and criminalization of Black 
Canadians. CRT scholars assert that, “in legal discourse, preconceptions and myths, for example 
about black criminality, shape mindset-the bundle of received wisdoms, stock stories, and 
suppositions that allocate suspicion, place the burden of proof on one party or the other, and tell 
is in cases of divided evidence what probably happened”.132  
Racial stereotypes concerning African Canadian criminality, including the belief that 
African Canadians are associated with drug trafficking and gun crimes, have resulted in the 
overcharging of Black men in those charge categories.133These beliefs create a self-fulfilling 
prophecy regarding Black men’s purported proclivity for committing violent offences.134As 
Tanovich aptly asserts: “so long as the police see the face of street level crime as Black, it will 
always remain so.”135Admittedly, there is a problem with violence in some Black communities, 
which is mostly due to socioeconomic factors. However, if Black people are more likely to 
engage in criminality, it may be a symptom of racist structural disadvantage.136As Paul Butler 
explained, albeit in the American context, but which is nonetheless applicable in the Canadian 
context:  
criminal conduct among African Americans is often a predictable reaction to oppression. 
Sometimes black crime is a symptom of internalized white supremacy; other times it is a 
reasonable response to the racial and economic subordination every African-American 
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faces every day. Punishing black people for the fruits of racism is wrong if that 
punishment is premised on the idea that it is the black criminal's "just deserts."137 
Indeed, some of the ex-offenders interviewed for this project expressed that Black men are more 
likely to be involved in gun and drug crimes. When asked to explain this assertion, one 
interviewee stated that having a gun is necessary to survive and to get food.138He furthermore 
explained that the court should take that into consideration when sentencing the person.139 
There exist a gun and drug problem in some communities across Canada, particularly 
Toronto, a fact that was emphasized by most of the ex-offender interviewees.140For many years, 
this problem has undergirded the deployment of police resources in primarily Black 
communities.141This issue has also been exploited by police to increase their use of racially 
motivated investigative methods, i.e. carding.142Criminologists and legal scholars agree that 
biased policing is one of the primary conduits through which Black bodies are transported into 
the criminal justice system.143There is a general consensus among scholars, which has been 
consistently supported by ample empirical evidence that this systemic injustice is a product of 
anti-Black racism.144The iconography and accompanying narrative of the ‘dangerous Black man’ 
is central in the decision-making around who, and how frequently, police officers, investigates, 
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arrests, and charges.145It may also guide crown prosecutors about what cases to proceed with, 
and ultimately guide judges in their sentencing of Black offenders.146The resulting influx of 
Black offenders before the criminal courts, and in prisons simultaneously produces and 
reproduces the notion and narrative of the recalcitrant and dangerous Black man. Thus, anti-
Black racism within the criminal justice system, particularly in the policing context, not only 
targets Black ‘offenders’ but is also instrumental in their creation.147This narrative, in some 
cases, travels with the offender from his initial arrest to the sentencing, which can result in 
disproportionate sentences for Black offenders.148For instance, recent studies by the Office of the 
Correctional Investigator (“OCI”) have recorded that Black Canadians are over-represented in 
the Federal prison population. The OCI found in 2015-2016 and 2016-2017 that while Blacks 
represented only 3% of Canada’s population, they make up 8.6% of all those federally 
incarcerated.149 This apparent over-representation was also recorded in Ontario.150 In one study it 
was found that “Black offenders were most likely to be incarcerated in Ontario.”151In Jackson, 
Justice Nakatsuru commented that “stripped to its essentials, African Canadians have been jailed 
three times more than their general representation in society for quite some time. The problem is 
not getting better”.152 
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There is also cogent evidence to suggest that Blackness is a central consideration in the 
public’s perception of sentence appropriateness.153This public perception has existed across 
space and time. Studies have found that in Ontario during the late 19th century to the middle of 
the 20thcentury, anti-Black stereotypes and attitudes were instrumental in sentencing 
outcomes.154These studies show that the over-incarceration of Black bodies is not a new 
phenomenon. However, in earlier times, sentencing disparities were more acute, and the reasons 
for the unfairness were generally explicitly stated. 155 For instance, some sentencing magistrates 
relied on stereotypical narratives and attitudes about Black Canadians in their sentencing of 
Black offenders. As Clayton Mosher argues: 
in such a climate of perceived threat, we would expect that black violent offenders would 
be treated more severely by the criminal courts, especially when they victimized Whites, 
and particularly in jurisdictions and in historical periods in which the numbers of Blacks 
posed a greater numerical threat to white Canadian society.156  
 
Barrington Walker similarly argues “that when Blacks appeared before the criminal courts, 
‘race,’ whether tacitly or overtly, procedurally or rhetorically, was on trial.”157During the periods 
under investigation, both Mosher and Walker found that the hysteria about Black dangerousness 
and volatility was an integral factor in sentencing determinations.158Race played a prominent role 
in sentencing, albeit for pernicious purposes. The offender's Blackness was seen as an 
aggravating factor, particularly if the crime involved a white victim, and served as a justification 
for his harsh treatment.159Moreover, even in cases where a white offender was convicted of a 
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similar offence, the Black offender would receive a harsher punishment.160According to Mosher, 
this disparity in punishment was a reaction to the so-called threat that Black bodies posed to 
Canadian society.161  
Historically “the criminal law was an integral part of how race was produced, managed, 
and expressed in the racial liberal order that framed the Black experience in Canada.”162Black 
bodies, however, continue to be coded as dangerous and posing a threat to public safety. There 
are no contemporary sentencing decisions that have overtly relied on the so-called causal link 
between Blackness and propensity for crime to justify excessive sentences. This transformation 
in sentencing decision-making may only represent a change in language but not attitudes, and 
indeed, it has had limited impact on sentencing outcomes of Black Canadians. Scholars who 
study the over-incarceration of racialized people have consistently reported that Black people are 
over-represented in prisons.163The cause of this disparity is multi-dimensional and complex. The 
Report of the Commission on Systemic Racism in the Ontario Criminal Justice System found 
that “racialized judgments and assumptions may also contribute to differential sentencing. They 
may directly influence the decisions of sentencing judges or may be transmitted from decisions 
made at earlier stages of the criminal justice process”.164 
It would be untenable for even the staunchest supporter of our criminal justice system to 
deny the fact that anti-Black racism infects the criminal justice system. As earlier as 1993, in the 
case of R v Parks, Doherty JA. held that:  
racism, and in particular anti-black racism, is a part of our community's psyche. A 
significant segment of our community holds overtly racist views. A much larger segment 
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subconsciously operates on the basis of negative racial stereotypes. Furthermore, our 
institutions, including the criminal justice system, reflect and perpetuate those negative 
stereotypes. These elements combine to infect our society as a whole with the evil of 
racism. Blacks are among the primary victims of that evil.165 
 
Stephen Lewis’ 1992 report on Race Relations in Ontario signalled, at the time, that anti-Black 
racism was the most pervasive form of racism in Ontario.166 In 1995 the Report of the 
Commission on Systemic Racism in the Ontario Criminal Justice System provided even more 
incontrovertible evidence to support the fact that anti-Black racism was prevalent within the 
criminal justice system.167Today hardly any judge, academician, or lawyer would question the 
existence of anti-Black racism in the criminal justice system. However, while its existence is not 
in dispute, nor is it as blatant as in previous eras, the impacts on Black communities nonetheless 
remain the same.  
Section E: Anti-Black Policing  
 
There is a direct and ongoing link between over-incarceration and Black 
overrepresentation in the criminal justice system. Today, the over-criminalization of Black 
people is primarily done through biased policing.168 It is generally accepted that one of the most 
insidious current practices of anti-Black racism is the race-based profiling of African-
Canadians.169Racially biased policing is a method of racialization in that it is used to construct 
the usual offender typology.170In R v Richards, quoting from the Intervener African Canadian 
Legal Clinic’s factum, racial profiling is defined as: 
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criminal profiling based on race. Racial or colour profiling refers to that phenomenon 
whereby certain criminal activity is attributed to an identified group in society on the 
basis of race or colour resulting in the targeting of individual members of that group. In 
this context, race is illegitimately used as a proxy for the criminality or general criminal 
propensity of an entire racial group.171 
The Report of the Commission on Systemic Racism in the Ontario Criminal Justice System 
found that: 
racialized characteristics, especially those of black people, in combination with other 
factors, provoke police suspicion, at least in Metro Toronto. Other factors that may attract 
police attention include sex (male), youth, make and condition of car (if any), location, 
dress, and perceived lifestyle. Black persons perceived to have many of these attributes 
are at high risk of being stopped on foot or in cars. This explanation is consistent with our 
findings that, overall, black people are more likely than others to experience the 
unwelcome intrusion of being stopped by the police, but black people are not equally 
vulnerable to such stops.172 
 
Racial profiling generally occurs when police, customs officers and crown prosecutors use race 
as a marker of distinction in the exercise of their statutory discretion.173Beyond the disadvantage, 
vulnerability, and stereotyping experienced by African Canadians in the wider society, African 
Canadians encounter racial discrimination, specifically in the context of policing. The 
disadvantage of African Canadians by the police is perpetuated and reinforced by virulent and 
pervasive anti-Black stereotypes. Black communities are generally classified as high-risk, but as 
Tanovich argues: 
designation [as a] ‘high crime area’ is not so much an accurate reflection that more crime 
occurs in the area as compared to other areas in the city, but rather, that the area is over-
policed. Moreover, as a matter of policy, treating the place of the stop as a relevant 
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consideration in the reasonable suspicion calculus unduly prejudices low-income and 
minority residents.174 
 
There is no reliable scientific evidence that Blacks are more prone to criminality than their non-
Black counterparts. Nevertheless, Black men are generally deemed presumptively dangerous; 
and are thereby more likely to be arrested, detained, charged, assaulted and killed by police in 
comparison to their white counterparts.175The fusion of Blackness and criminality arguably 
undergirds police practices, scrutiny and allocation of resources. Some scholars have even 
asserted that racial profiling is law enforcement tool, albeit an unreliable one.176 Through the 
vehicle of racial profiling, Black bodies are ‘othered’ and made the subject of unwanted and 
extreme scrutiny. Despite Black Canadians’ putative membership in Canadian society, there 
exists an almost impassable gulf between him and his non-racialized counterparts. He walks 
among them, but he is not one of them.  
Othering operates as a justification for the different forms of police interaction 
experienced by Black Canadians in comparison to their non-Black counterparts.177 The 
stereotypical Black suspect is a central consideration in so-called proactive policing.178 For 
example, the creation of a suspect profile may operate as an early method of detecting crime. 
Given prevalent stereotypes about Black Canadians’ so-called volatility and dangerousness, they 
are usually defined as the archetypal suspect.179For this reason, inter alia, it may be argued that 
Black Canadians exist in a perpetual state of criminal liability. It is becoming increasingly 
irrefutable, that Black lives are under constant assault by police. Therefore, the unfair 
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presumption of Black dangerousness should be redirected to the police, because it is manifestly 
clear that Black Canadians face more danger from those who have sworn to protect their lives. 
The prevalence and salience of race-based police discrimination contribute to and entrenches the 
general mistrust and ambivalence expressed by Black Canadians towards the criminal justice 
system. In Le, which will be discussed in more detail below, the Court accepted that practices 
such as carding and racial profiling “contributes to the continuing social exclusion of racial 
minorities, encourages a loss of trust in the fairness of our criminal justice system, and 
perpetuates criminalization.”180  
There are procedural mechanisms entrenched within the Charter that may be used to 
eradicate or at least address biased policing. However, there has been a conspicuous erasure of 
race in the Court’s Charter jurisprudence, particularly in the Court’s jurisprudence on 
policing.181Despite judicial and scholarly recognition of this phenomenon and its damaging 
impacts on Black bodies and communities, the Court has only ever marginally engaged in a race-
based analysis of the Charter rights that are engaged by police encounters.182Tanovich argues 
that since its inception, the Charter has had minimal impact on racial injustice in Canada. Racial 
justice he asserts “has not had a chance to grow because of trial and appellate lawyers’ failure to 
engage in race talk in the courts and a failure of the judiciary to adopt appropriate critical race 
standards when invited to do so.”183 
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Section F: Do Black Lives Even Matter? 
 
The criminal justice system has shaped current narratives about Black people and in so 
doing, provided the ontological foundations for the denial of Black innocence and humanity. 
Many of the ex-offenders interviewed for this project agreed that Blackness and innocence are 
mutually exclusive concepts. One interviewee even remarked that even though I can’t see inside 
the judge’s mind, I believe that Blacks are sentenced harsher because of our colour.184A.W.'s 
comment seems to suggest that, albeit in his own mind, that his mere physical presence provided 
the rationale for harsh treatment. What does this statement reveal about how Black Canadians 
perceive their bodies? It has been suggested by one commentator that “the black body is not 
viewed as being capable of making the progression from the bodily identity to consciousness and 
morality that Locke feels is necessary for the governance of, and participation in, civil 
society.”185In some sense, degradation has been inscribed on the bodies and psyches of Black 
people. A degraded body is ripe for destruction. Criminal punishment is a salient method through 
which Black bodies are degraded, and ultimately destroyed. James Q. Whitman, argues that “we 
all know intuitively that degradation, in this sense, often plays a significant role in punishment: 
part of what makes punishments effective is their power to degrade—their power to make the 
person punished feel diminished, lessened, lowered.”186 
There exist in Canada, and perhaps more recognizable in the United States, a relationship 
between Black bodies and punishment.187Anti-Blackness strips Black bodies of the ability to 
express or sense remorse, embody innocence or be worthy of mercy. In other words, Black 
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bodies exist in a state of moral blameworthiness and guilt; and is thus always worthy of, and 
available for punishment. Degradation does not only occur as a result of criminal punishment; 
rather, it permeates the lives of Black Canadians and reduces the value of Blackness. This 
systematic devaluation results in social death and a certain “nothingness.”188To put another way, 
Black lives do not matter. Calvin L. Warren explains that the question of whether Black lives 
matter, “reemerges within a world of antiblack brutality, a world in which black torture, 
dismemberment, fatality, and fracturing are routinized and ritualized — a global, sadistic 
pleasure principle.”189  
To understand anti-Blackness, it is crucial to not only focus on its intellectual 
dimensions, but also its aesthetic contours. As Sherene Razack explains, “race is crucial to pre-
emptive punishment” as “risk is read on the body.”190Razack makes this claim in the context of 
the war on terror and its relationship with Muslim bodies. Her basic premise, however, applies to 
what can only be characterized as a war on Blackness. Any discourse of risk is inherently race-d 
as we pre-emptively read risk on certain bodies. Black bodies are inscribed with notions of risk, 
lethality, and danger, and in some sense, have become weaponized.191These inscriptions support 
the presupposition that Black bodies are to be approached with caution and in some cases, met 
with pre-emptive violence. Moreover, anti-Blackness can be characterized as constructing an 
Agambenian ‘state of exception’, wherein the very existence Black bodies creates a permanent 
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state of emergency.192 In international public law scholarship, most notably works on the war on 
terror, in times of emergency, the sovereign is justified in exempting itself from the established 
legal order.193 The state of exception doctrine “can be best described as a move from defence to 
prevention or as a move from deterrence to risk management.”194However, Scheuerman argues 
that “rulers exploit crisis situations to augment their personal and institutional power, relying on 
emergencies to transform the existing legal framework.”195 
The Black crisis/emergency (“the war on Blackness”) is not a Black creation; instead, it 
is the consequence of an evolution of hate that has been mobilized and manipulated to keep 
peoples of African descent subjugated and oppressed. The need to dominate and punish Black 
bodies has continued unabated since slavery. This intergenerational and systemic oppression of 
Black peoples has created a deeply entrenched sense of vigilance and fear within the collective 
Black psyche. Critical Black psychologists, social workers, and trauma workers have 
characterized this experience as post-traumatic slavery disorder.196Research into this trauma is 
reshaping and revolutionizing our understanding of Black trauma and its various manifestations. 
At the core of this scholarship “is to call attention to an array of attitudes, habits and behaviours 
which clearly follow a direct lineage to slavery.”197While slavery is no longer a physical reality 
for Black Canadians, its lingering effects are viscerally felt through the over-criminalization of 
the Black body.198Indeed, punishment continues to define the relationship between the state and 
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African Canadians. This statement is not born out of racial paranoia, as there exists ample 
sociological data that supports the notion that it is dangerous to be Black in Canada.199Despite 
these studies, we are still faced with the same fundamental problem - police misuse and abuse of 
their powers in their interactions with African Canadians. Akwatu Khenti argues that 
“unbeknownst to many Canadians, Black communities in Canada have been the target of 
intensive policing since the inception of the War on Drugs in the 1980s, especially in the 
province of Ontario where most Blacks reside”.200He further argues that a: “direct result of the 
inordinate police focus on Black communities has been a pattern of racialized mass 
incarceration, exemplified by a vast overrepresentation of Blacks within the federal offender 
population in prisons across Canada.”201   
Section G: Beyond Anti-Black Policing 
 
Anti-Black policing is one of several methods through which Black bodies are 
criminalized. There exist other feeder systems that are equally as complicit in the streaming of 
Black bodies into the criminal justice system, not the least of which is the educational system.202 
This phenomenon is often referred to as the school-to-prison pipeline.203Sibblis argues that 
school expulsion programs operate as carceral spaces for Black bodies.204She further explains 
that “the carceral spaces within the educational system are a constant reminder to black students 
of their abnormality, incompetence and perniciousness.”205Studies have concluded that Black 
students are disproportionately suspended and expelled and subjected to harsher punishments 
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compared to their similarly situated white counterparts.206 The disciplining of Black students is, 
in many ways, similar to the treatment of Black offenders and suspects. Sibblis asserts that: 
the civilian (student) outside of the prison is inside of another prison - the classroom. As 
he puts it, the outside is always already inside. For these students there is no exit-no 
escape in life from imprisonment and violence. If black students are criminalized and 
incarcerated in schools, one of their first identity-forming, socializing institutions, where 
can they be safe from violence? The one thing that schools-turned-carceral spaces teach 
the students contained within is that violence is endemic to all institutions and likely, all 
spaces.207 
A discussion about the school-to-prison pipeline, and similar feeder engines, child welfare, etc., 
to the criminal justice system, is crucial in understanding the intricate and devastating web of 
violence experienced by Black Canadians. However, a more fulsome discussion of this 
phenomenon is beyond the scope of this project. Suffice it to say, addressing any one system in 
isolation will not properly elucidate the complex nature of anti-Black racism and its various 
manifestations. To fully appreciate the impact that anti-Black racism has had on an individual’s 
life, it is critically important to understand the convergence of various oppressive experiences 
throughout that person’s life. Anti-Black racism cannot be summed up in one explanatory 
statement; it is the aggregate of a lifetime of experiences rooted in slavery and intergenerational 
trauma. However, it should be noted that “anti-Black racism does not affect all Blacks in the 
same way. Just as blackness itself is hotly contested, the vile practice of anti-Black racism is also 
an uneven territory with varying contours”.208The immediate goal of this thesis, however, is to 
address anti-Black racism in ‘a specific’ moment/experience: namely, during criminal 
sentencing. 
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Section H: CIARs/IRCARs and Sentencing Reform (A Partial Solution?)  
 
Given that over-policing is one among a constellation of factors that leads to the over-
incarceration of Black Canadians, it is, therefore, a partial causal explanation for the 
phenomenon that CIARs/IRCARs are seeking to redress. There are other sources of oppression 
that contribute in equal part to this problem, i.e. education, child welfare, etc. The routine use of 
IRCARs/CIARs may be a catalyst for sentencing reform, but is at best, a partial solution for the 
over-criminalization and disproportionate incarceration of African Canadians, and the broader 
problem of anti-Black racism. This issue can also be attributed to decisions made at all other 
phases of the criminal justice process, including legislation, policing, charging/prosecutorial 
discretion, plea-bargaining, adjudication by judges/juries, parole hearings, etc. Moreover, the 
over-criminalization of Black bodies also relates to broader antecedent problems of anti-Black 
racism that result in more African Canadians finding themselves on the “assembly line”209 of the 
criminal justice system. To address this issue requires a radical multi-system critique and perhaps 
a wholesale dismantling of these structures of violence. Sentencing reform, through the extensive 
use of CIARs/IRCARs, is, in some sense conservative, since it seeks to work within the criminal 
justice system's existing norms and structures. The current norms and structures of the existing 
criminal justice system are flawed, and intrinsically racist, and cannot coexist with genuine racial 
equality.210In that vein, sentencing reform may not be a workable or desirable solution to the 
problem of the over-criminalization and over-incarceration of Black bodies and the broader 
problem of anti-Black racism.  
Notwithstanding the call for a radical structural critique of our current criminal justice 
system, it is laudable that proponents of IRCARs/CIARs seek to use the “master’s tool to 
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dismantle the master’s house.”211By attempting to achieve racial equality within a structure that 
is infected with racism, IRCARs/CIARs, in a sense, seek to have the system ‘turn on itself.’ The 
aim is to create the procedural space to discuss Blackness – not merely as a means of 
acknowledging what is already a notorious fact, but by fundamentally altering the current 
sentencing regime and its hostility to Black bodies. However, there is reason to believe that this 
change may only be achieved through legislative intervention. For now, sentencing reform for 
Black Canadians may only be achieved through judicial intervention sparked by the increased 
usage of IRCARs/CIARs. These reports are designed to highlight specific cultural, social, and 
political mitigating factors that ought to be considered in the sentencing of African Canadian 
offenders.212The objective of these reports, which will be discussed in more detail below, is to, 
inter alia, highlight an offender’s Blackness in order to, paradoxically, diminish the racist 
attributions generally assigned to Blackness. The idea is that emphasizing race, during the 
sentencing phase, will lead to more proportionate sentences. A primary objective of progressive 
criminal justice reform, arguably, should be the promotion and facilitation of proportionate 
sentences for Black Canadians.  
As discussed above, bias at the sentencing phase results in harsher and disproportionate 
sentences for Black offenders compared to their similarly-situated white counterparts, thereby 
exacerbating the problem of the over-incarceration of Black bodies in correctional facilities at 
both the Federal and Provincial level.213IRCARs/CIARs strive to draw attention to this 
phenomenon and attempt to ameliorate this injustice. They aim to propagate a counter-narrative 
that rejects the myth of colour-blindness and provides an interpretive frame that displays a more 
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robust picture of the offender. The next section of this thesis will explore whether 
IRCARs/CIARs can be salutary within the current sentencing regime.  
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Chapter Three: Sentencing Theory and the Black Experience 
 
Section A: Proportionality and Blame 
 
Why we punish and how we punish are deep philosophical questions that are brought into 
sharp relief when we consider the fundamental principle of criminal sentencing.214 The current 
sentencing regime under section 718 of the Criminal Code is premised on the fundamental 
principle of proportionality and retribution.215While retribution is not expressly part of the 
section 718 framework, it is implicit in the notion of proportionality as enshrined in the Criminal 
Code and expounded by the Court.216Both the fundamental principle of proportionality and 
retribution aims to apportion and calibrate blame. Proportionate sentences/punishments must 
consider both the gravity of the crime and the offender's level of blameworthiness.217However, 
blameworthiness, particularly in the context of structural racism, is profoundly controversial and 
anathema to Black communities. The concept of blame is rendered hollow when we are 
considering the crimes committed by people who have minimal opportunities and options due to 
structural violence. Black Canadians are stereotyped as incorrigible, inherently violent, 
blameworthy and dangerous due to racist stereotypes that were part of the logic of slavery, and 
today, we determine criminal sentences in part by trying to determine the extent to which an 
offender is: violent, incorrigible, blameworthy and dangerous. As Paul Butler argues, we are 
essentially “punishing people for "negative" reactions to racist, oppressive conditions.”218  
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Scholars assert that proportionality functions as a restraint mechanism against grossly 
severe punishments or those that are unjustifiably lenient.219The offender ought to be punished 
fairly - no more or less than he deserves. Thus, the duty of a sentencing judge is to strike an 
appropriate and fair balance of just deserts. He or she must weigh complicated and contradictory 
factors.220Some scholars have examined whether social deprivation should be a factor in this 
balancing exercise.221Others assert that “the institution of criminal punishment is not an 
appropriate ‘instrument’ to resolve social problems.222Retributivists assert that proportionality is 
an equitable concept because it seeks to curb arbitrary punishment and ensure parity in 
sentencing allocation.223According to Von Hirsch “when proportionality is disregarded, 
offenders are unfairly visited, through the penalties imposed on them, with more implicit blame 
(or less) than the actual blameworthiness of their conduct warrants.”224Therefore, 
proportionality, from a retributive perspective, is understood as a theory of justice that allocates 
punishment based on the fair distribution of blame/desert. 
 As mentioned above, blameworthiness, as it is understood within our current sentencing 
framework, is an insidious and controversial concept within Black communities. Strict adherence 
to the proportionality/blameworthiness framework may actually result in injustice for Black 
offenders. As Carol Steiker argues, “retributivism’s chief distortion is its inability to take account 
of the effects of widespread social and economic inequality on its central determination of 
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desert.”225There is ample evidence to suggest that our system of criminal justice is skewed 
towards the over-punishment of Black offenders.226Some scholars have even advocated for the 
introduction of mercy into criminal sentencing as a means of (over)correcting for this “punitive 
turn.”227 
Section B: Creating Space for Mercy 
 
Mercy is an elusive concept that has intrigued theologians, philosophers and jurists for 
generations.228The scholarly literature on mercy is abundant and spans both time and discipline. 
Thus, it is beyond the scope of this project to provide an exhaustive treatment of mercy. It will 
suffice, however, for current purposes, to briefly sketch three (3) possible ways in which mercy 
can be understood within criminal sentencing, specifically in the context of race-based 
sentencing. First, the thesis will consider whether, in some instances, it is appropriate for 
sentencing judges to dispense mercy as a means of displacing justice in pursuit of other relevant 
social goals.229Second, it will discuss whether proportionality can be achieved through the 
granting of merciful sentences that aim to (over)correct the inherent bias towards over-punishing 
Black Canadians.230Third, it will explore how mercy tracks with notions of hierarchy and 
degradation.231  
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Before commencing a more specific discussion on how mercy may achieve racial justice, 
it is critical to provide a brief definition of the concept. In the sentencing context, mercy 
connotes the granting of a gift, in the form of reduced punishment, from a sentencing judge to an 
offender.232The offender has no right, nor does he deserve this gift on account of him conducting 
himself in a manner that appropriately attracts censure or punishment. Therefore, when a 
sentencing judge dispenses mercy, she is acting magnanimously towards someone undeserving. 
Some scholars, however, argue that mercy may be fundamentally incompatible with the demands 
of justice insofar as granting mercy, in some cases, may require deviations from justice.233There 
is a concern that mercy cannot coexist with justice as the demands of both are, at times, mutually 
exclusive. The question is, “whether mercy can be a public value at all and whether it has any 
place in a properly functioning criminal justice system.”234For example, imagine an offender 
who is convicted of committing a serious offence that ought to attract a significant jail term, but 
who instead receives probation on account of the sentencing judge showing him leniency. From 
a retributivist perspective, such a result is not in accordance with the principle of proportionality, 
which requires an offender to be punished commensurate with the seriousness of the offence and 
his level of blameworthiness.235However, while mercy may be in contention with justice, this 
does not render mercy an illegitimate factor for consideration in a retributive/proportionality-
based sentencing framework.236  
It is possible that in some situations to achieve justice, particularly racial justice, it may 
be necessary to temper the demands of justice with mercy. Mercy may provide a way for 
thinking through other goals the State can legitimately pursuit, apart from, or in addition to the 
                                                          
232 Nathan Brett, “Mercy and Criminal Justice: A Plea for Mercy” (1992) 5:1 Can JL & Jur at 82. 
233 R A Duff, "The Intrusion of Mercy" (2007) 4:2 Ohio State J of Crim L 361. 
234 Carol Steiker, supra note 222 at 221. 
235 Supra note 225 at 10. 
236 Nathan Brett, supra note 229; Supra note 225; Richard G. Fox, ibid. 
55 
 
imperatives of proportionate justice. It frames alternative imperatives that may exist in 
contention with retribution/proportionality accounts of sentencing but is also properly considered 
by the criminal law and the State.237On this account, there may be justifiable reasons to deviate 
from proportionate justice through the granting of disproportionately reduced sentences to Black 
offenders. For example, the State may grant mercy as a means of seeking to redress historical 
wrongs, which serves to communicate messages to the community and the accused person that 
does not fixate on the offender’s blameworthiness.238There is ongoing debate by retributivist 
scholars around the appropriateness of mercy within the criminal justice system, particularly as a 
means of redressing social ills. There are, however, examples in the procedural realm, for 
instance, under subsection 24(2) of the Charter, were judges routinely compromise truth-seeking 
values in order to condemn improper State conduct.239In that vein, it is reasonable for 
CIARs/IRCARs to seek deviations from retributive/proportionality values in order to condemn 
State and societal behaviour as it relates to virulent anti-Black racism.   
However, mercy talk, like race talk, elicits discomfort and controversy. Indeed, this 
approach would be considered a radical departure from the current sentencing paradigm 
contemplated by section 718 of the Criminal Code, and as expounded in Gladue and Ipeelee.240 
Under this regime, proportionality sets both the ceiling and floor for punishment. Thus, any 
further considerations simply operate to assist in calibrating a proportionate sentence. The goal is 
to allocate punishment based on a fair distribution of blame/desert. However, blame is a 
                                                          
237 See generally Carol Steiker, “Criminalization and the Criminal Process: Prudential Mercy as a Limit on Penal 
Sanctions in an Era of Mass Incarceration” in R.A. Duff, Lindsay Farmer, S.E. Marshall, Massimo Renzo & Victor 
Tadros, The Boundaries of the Criminal Law (Oxford ; New York : Oxford University Press, 2010). 
238Carmela Murdocca, supra note 23; Carmela Murdocca, “National Responsibility and Systemic Racism in 
Criminal Sentencing: The Case of R. v. Hamilton” in Nicholas Blomley and Sean Robertson, eds. The Place of 
Justice (Vancouver: Fernwood Publishing, 2006) 67. 
239 Charter. 
240 Supra note 29; R v Gladue, [1999] 1 SCR 688, 1999 CanLII 679 (SCC) 
56 
 
deceptive concept within Black communities. Indeed, what may be deemed as a proportionate 
sentence for a Black offender may, in fact, on more objective measures, be disproportionate and 
unduly harsh. As Steiker argues: 
if sentences were subject to review for comparative proportionality (i.e., have a similarly 
harsh sentences been imposed in the past for similar conduct?) and for equal protection 
(i.e., are different racial, ethnic, and geographic groups sentenced similarly for similar 
conduct?), both the amount and the distribution of criminal punishment would likely 
change for the better.241  
 
She further asserts that mercy is not incompatible with proportionality if it is regarded as 
corrective, i.e. as a means of prompting proportionality in systems that are predictably too 
harsh.242For instance, given that certain people are routinely over-punished, a sentence that 
seems “merciful” in the sense of being disproportionately low, maybe more commensurate with 
blameworthiness, and hence more proportionate. Indeed, equal sentences for similarly situated 
offenders, without regard to demographic status, are not merciful – they are the baseline for 
formal equality. To achieve this goal, it is necessary to radically overcorrect for the inherent bias 
towards harshness when dealing with Black offenders. In that vein, to correct this bias may 
require sentencing judges to grant, what may appear at first glance, to be a lenient sentence but 
one which is, in fact, proportionate. 
At the same time, “mercy” suggests attention to other normative considerations beyond 
retributivist/proportionate punishment, such as forgiveness, humility, etc. that could properly 
play a role in criminal justice. 243However, there are concerns that mercy may track with notions 
of hierarchy, power and degradation.244On this account, mercy involves performances of power 
differentials, which in some cases may exacerbate and reinforce prevailing societal 
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hierarchies.245As a Black man, who has been on both sides of this punitive turn, as an offender 
and then defence counsel, I am attracted to the notion that racial justice can displace or at the 
very least, temper the fervour of retribution. However, some of the ex-offenders interviewed for 
this project did not desire mercy/leniency - instead, they sought equal treatment (same treatment 
as his similarly-situated white counterpart). One interviewee opined that he desired the same 
treatment as a white accused and did not want his race or the circumstances brought on by that 
status, to strip him of the dignity of being punished like a white man who committed a 
comparable offence. He remarked that if I deserve the punishment, then I deserve it. To treat me 
otherwise is undignified.246This statement suggests that the ex-offender would rather the 
adoption of the 'fiction' of colour-blindness in his/her sentencing analysis. Another interviewee, 
worried that an over-exaggeration of his race may result in the aggravation of his sentence; thus, 
he prescribes utter silence about race, whether for mitigation purposes or as a plea for mercy.247 
It is not difficult to see how a plea for mercy or leniency may be perceived as an affront to a 
Black man’s dignity. The wounds of slavery are still fresh, and the images are etched in the 
Black community’s collective psyche. Thus, pleading to a white judge may be construed as a 
reversion in dignity. Equal treatment, even if it means harsh treatment, is more welcomed than 
preferential treatment grounded in white compassion. 
The current punitive climate disproportionately impacts Black Canadians, thereby 
‘drying’ up what little mercy may exist for Black offenders facing punishment. This argument, 
however, presupposes that mercy can/should only flow uni-directionally. IRCARs/CIARs 
operate as a means of promoting and facilitating a bilateral flow of mercy.  This approach can be 
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conceptualized as a shared grant of mercy. One in which both parties, the State and Black 
offenders, seek and grant mercy. The proposed approach imagines a situation whereby the State 
seeks mercy from Black Canadians by providing quantitatively and qualitatively better sentences 
for Black offenders, and in turn, a Black offender may feel morally emancipated when he or she 
makes a plea for mercy. This approach is a dignity affirming compromise. It is not about 
compensating for past wrongs; instead, it serves as the repatriation of stolen/lost dignity. 
Section C: Personal Narrative (My Experience with Mercy)  
 
I have been arrested many times.  Several of those arrests resulted in criminal charges. 
Fortunately, I have only ever been found guilty once. This finding of guilt was the result of a 
crack charge I caught following a sloppy drug deal. I had just left the home of one of my 
customers (“custy”). As I left his house, I broke a few cardinal rules: I placed the remaining 
crack in my pocket; I permitted my driver, a custy, to travel with his crack pipe; and, I also 
travelled with a friend who was “packing” (armed with a gun). As we drove along the road, I 
sensed that we were being followed. I attempted to tell the driver to find a different route, but by 
that time, it was too late. I saw the lights and heard the sirens. It was an undercover police 
vehicle. They approached the car with guns drawn. They saw the driver’s crack pipe in plain 
sight. I was ordered out of the vehicle and searched. The police found a gram of crack and a 
knife in my pants pocket. My friend was searched, and a gun was found in his waistband. We 
were all arrested and charged. I was charged with possessing one (1) gram of crack cocaine for 
the purpose of trafficking and possessing a dangerous weapon. I managed to secure bail.  
Following a few court appearances, my lawyer implored me to plead guilty. The crown 
prosecutor wanted a jail sentence. My lawyer sought a conditional discharge or suspended 
sentence. I pleaded guilty. My lawyer made his argument for a conditional discharge. He 
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emphasized that I did not have a criminal record, I was caught with only a small amount of 
crack, I was a youthful offender, and I was enrolled in an adult high school program. The Crown 
argued for jail. He emphasized the fact that my co-accused was found with a gun. He also relied 
on cases that, despite the mitigating factors I listed, still supported a short stint in jail. After the 
submissions, the judge invited me to address the court. I felt a sense of dissociation. 
The entire courtroom was white. I was in Gatineau, Quebec. The judge, defence lawyer, 
Crown, court staff, police officers and court service officers were all white. I was the only Black 
body in the courtroom. They were all speaking French. My lawyer and the judge were the only 
individuals that spoke to me in English. I stared blankly at the judge and muttered something that 
I now realize must have been incoherent drivel. The judge thanked me and then stared at me 
sternly. He spoke perfect English. He was ‘perfectly’ white. No one mentioned anything about 
my race or culture. But at that moment, I felt extremely Black. I whispered to myself: I am going 
to jail. Then the judge said something that still puzzles me to this day. He said, Mr. Jones, you 
are young and have potential. I will not burden you with a criminal record. I accept your 
lawyer’s submissions and will grant you a conditional discharge. I was startled. As were the 
Crown and the police officers. I walked out of the courthouse not understanding what had taken 
place. The lesson I learned at the time was to avoid selling drugs in Quebec. However, the 
judge’s words stayed with me. They haunted me. He saw potential in me and a person deserving 
of compassion, whereas all I saw in him was the whiteness that I was taught to be frightened of.  
Section D: The Gladue Influence 
 
African Canadians are not the only targets of racism within the criminal justice system. 
Evidence suggests that Indigenous peoples are also among the oppressed victims of the 
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system.248The Court examined this issue in the case of R v Gladue.249 The appellant, Jamie Tanis 
Gladue, pled guilty to manslaughter in the stabbing death of her common-law partner. At her 
sentencing hearing, the judge determined that he would not consider the indigeneity of both the 
accused and the victim. He sentenced her to three years imprisonment. Ms. Gladue’s appeal to 
the British Columbia Court of Appeal was dismissed. The issue before the Court was the proper 
interpretation of subsection 718.2(e) of the Criminal Code, which reads as follows: 
718.2 A court that imposes a sentence shall also take into consideration the following 
principles: 
                                                            . . . 
(e)  all available sanctions other than imprisonment that are reasonable in the 
circumstances should be considered for all offenders, with particular attention to the 
circumstances of aboriginal offenders.250 
 
Subsection 718.2(e) was introduced in 1996, following numerous, longstanding calls for judicial 
and legislative action.251For the first time, Parliament explicitly recognized the need for a 
different sentencing framework for Indigenous offenders. In Gladue, the Court constructed a new 
sentencing methodology for lower court judges tasked with sentencing Indigenous offenders.252 
The Court reaffirmed its position in R v Wells and later in R v Ipeelee.253The restraint principle, 
enshrined in subsection 718.2(e), instructs courts to use imprisonment as a last resort, paying 
particular attention to the circumstances of Aboriginal offenders. The Court discussed that there 
existed an over-incarceration problem in Canada, particularly as it relates to Indigenous 
offenders. They also found that “overreliance upon incarceration is a problem with the general 
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population (but) is of much greater concern in the sentencing of aboriginal Canadians.”254The 
Court determined that subsection 718.2(e) is remedial legislation that “is designed to ameliorate 
the serious problem of overrepresentation of aboriginal people in prisons, and to encourage 
sentencing judges to have recourse to a restorative approach to sentencing.”255Thus, subsection 
718.2(e) provided the statutory framework that ushered in the Court’s methodological shift in the 
sentencing of Indigenous offenders. 
 Since this landmark decision, courts have been empowered to consider relevant systemic 
and background factors in the sentencing of an Indigenous offender. Since Gladue, defence 
lawyers proffer systemic and background evidence in the form of a Gladue report to provide the 
sentencing judge with a picture of the offender in order to provide the necessary circumstances 
for judicial consideration.256This evidence is considered along with the judge’s own taking of 
judicial notice about the plight of Indigenous peoples in Canada, both in a historical and 
contemporaneous context.257  
The critical thing to note is that subsection 718.2(e) applies to all offenders, not just 
Indigenous offenders.258Jonathan Rudin has even asserted that this subsection has actually 
“largely benefitted non-Aboriginal people.”259Though the subsection mentions all offenders, the 
Gladue decision was meant to address and attempt to ameliorate the over-imprisonment of 
Indigenous peoples.260By adhering to the principles expounded in Gladue, sentencing “judges 
can ensure that systemic factors do not lead inadvertently to discrimination in sentencing.”261The 
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Court dismissed criticisms that the subsection and its interpretation amounted to nothing more 
than a race-based discount that “invites sentencing judges to impose more lenient sentences” on 
Aboriginal offenders.262 The Court further explained that systemic and background factors might 
have a significant impact on the moral blameworthiness of an offender insofar that it may 
constrain that individual's options for “positive development.”263As Lebel J. stated in Ipeelee:  
many Aboriginal offenders find themselves in situations of social and economic 
deprivation with a lack of opportunities and limited options for positive 
development….The existence of such circumstances may also indicate that a sanction that 
takes account of the underlying causes of the criminal conduct may be more appropriate 
than one only aimed at punishment per se.264 
 
It is, however, critical to explore the post-Gladue scholarship that criticized the decision’s 
efficacy in ameliorating the Indigenous incarceration problem in Canada. For example, Phillip 
Stenning and Julian V. Roberts criticized the Court’s prioritization of indigeneity where, they 
argue, the critical cause for concern was social disadvantage.265Essentially these scholars argued 
that there was nothing unique or special about this particular offender population. The 
Indigenous experience within the criminal justice system was not any different from other 
marginalized and socially disadvantaged groups. Thus, no special recognition should be given to 
this group lest it results in unfairness to similarly situated offenders.266Critics of this argument, 
particularly Jonathan Rudin and Kent Roach, responded by explaining that how Aboriginal 
offenders experience social disadvantage is different from other groups that do not share the 
history that Aboriginal peoples have with the Canadian State. This history is rooted in 
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colonialism.267In a later paper, Rudin, however, questions the efficacy of the Gladue and Ipeelee 
decisions on reducing incarceration rates.268Indeed, since the Gladue decision, Indigenous 
incarceration rates have remained at disproportionate levels.269 
Section E: Applying Gladue Principles to Black offenders? 
 
There is a paucity of literature examining the connections between anti-Black racism and 
criminal sentencing. Canadian Scholars have instead focused primarily on the relationship 
between indigeneity and sentencing. This scholarly focus is understandable, given the 
disproportionate rates at which Indigenous people (male and female) are imprisoned in Canadian 
penal institutions; and, the fact that, in response, Canadian legislators and judges have developed 
a distinct sentencing regime for Indigenous offenders. In Gladue, the Court held that judges 
tasked with sentencing an Indigenous offender must consider: 
(a)the unique systemic or background factors which may have played a part in bringing 
the particular aboriginal offender before the courts; and (b) the types of sentencing 
procedures and sanctions which may be appropriate in the circumstances for the offender 
because of his or her particular aboriginal heritage or connection.270 
 
This case-specific information may take the form of a presentence report/or Gladue report that 
compiles relevant systemic and background information about the offender and may make 
recommendations about appropriate culturally salient sentences.271In this sense, Gladue reports 
are not analogous to section 721 pre-sentence reports (“PSRs”), which generally does not include 
cultural relevant information or provides the basis for restorative sentencing options.272Gladue 
reports are prepared by trained Indigenous caseworkers, unlike PSRs that are often prepared by 
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probation officers who may lack the necessary cultural lens to produce a report that aids a 
sentencing judge in formulating a proportionate sentence for an Indigenous offender.273 
CIARs/IRCARS are similar to Gladue reports insofar as they are often prepared by clinical 
social workers and race and crime scholars with an anti-oppression and anti-racist lens. They 
provide an assessment of the offender’s background and social circumstances and how these 
likely influenced the offender’s decision to commit the offence for which he or she is being 
sentenced. Like, Gladue reports, CIARs/IRCARs are not simply pre-sentence reports. They do, 
however, share some similarities with Gladue reports. For instance, CIARs provide judges with 
insights about systemic racism and other structural inequalities. They also provide “a more 
textured, multi-dimensional framework for understanding the defendant, his background and his 
behaviours.”274 
While there exists no clear legislative and jurisprudential basis to consider the social and 
cultural circumstances of Black offenders when crafting a sentence, in theory, CIARs/IRCARs 
like Gladue reports should assist sentencing judges in achieving proportionality and advance 
current sentencing goals (i.e. denunciation, deterrence, rehabilitation, etc.). However, there are 
questions around whether these sentencing reference points can be harnessed to promote justice. 
It is essential to think critically about these sentencing goals and the notion of proportionality 
considering the current debates around general sentencing theory expounded above. Given that 
the blueprint and justification for CIARs/IRCARs are similar to the methodology/structure 
offered by the Court in Gladue, Wells and Ipeelee, scholarly analyses of Gladue reports can be 
cautiously applied to the CIAR/IRCAR context. Indeed, the Indigenous experience is instructive 
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in understanding the potential and pitfalls of the CIARs/IRCARs movement, given that this 
movement is in its infancy.  
It may also be helpful to consider the potential and pitfalls around the fight against anti-
Black racial profiling. It is widely accepted that the criminalization of Blackness is the impetus 
behind anti-Black policing, and the disparity in Black incarceration rates.275Despite this 
recognition, anti-Black policing practices, for instance carding, pretext stops, overcharging, 
unreasonable searches, and arbitrary detentions, continue to result in a high number of 
prosecutions. It is, however, rarely the case that defence counsel will challenge the police’s 
misconduct, and if challenged it is seldom accepted by the court.276However, there have been 
some notable successes, most recently in Le, which will be discussed in detail below.  
Section F: Confronting Blackness in Sentencing 
 
Canadian courts inadequately address the issue of Blackness, and criminal justice, not 
just at the guilt phase of the criminal process but more acutely at sentencing. It has only been 
recently that some judges have begun to consider with any seriousness the role Blackness plays 
in sentencing considerations.277The IRCAR/CIAR movement has proved to be a sort of 
renaissance insofar as it may have sparked a willingness for some defence lawyers, crowns and 
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judges to begin to meaningfully engage with the notion of Blackness and its place in Canadian 
sentencing law.278 
IRCARs/CIARs were introduced, respectively, in 2014 in Nova Scotia279 and 2018 in 
Ontario.280Before the introduction of these reports, the Court of Appeal for Ontario in R v Borde 
(“Borde”) held that in some instances sentencing judges are justified in considering systemic and 
background factors - if those factors are linked to the commission of the offence and the 
offender’s community values.281Since Borde, there have several reported Ontario and Nova 
Scotia sentencing decisions where the race and culture of African-Canadian offenders are 
explicitly discussed.282A few decisions in the Provinces of British Columbia and Manitoba and 
the Territory of Yukon that has dealt with this issue tangentially.283Judges in Nova Scotia and 
Ontario have, however, taken up this issue in a more direct manner by accepting 
CIARs/IRCARs, or by taking judicial notice, to assist them in understanding the links between 
Blackness and the offence committed. However, given the decision in Hamilton, one may 
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question the efficacy of CIARs/IRCARs in Ontario.284This decision stands for the proposition 
that an offender’s membership in a historically marginalized, oppressed and disadvantaged group 
does not in and of itself justify mitigation of sentence.285Despite this challenge, some lawyers 
have recently been deploying CIARs/IRCARs as a means of highlight specific cultural, social, 
and political mitigating factors that ought to be considered in the sentencing of African Canadian 
offenders. 
R v “X” in Nova Scotia and Jackson, in Ontario, are the first cases to utilize 
CIARs/IRCARs.286In the seminal case of X, defence counsel sought to have an expert in race and 
culture qualified as an expert and also to have his report on the impact of race and culture 
adduced into evidence. The facts of this case, as will be explored below, demonstrated a similar 
‘brand’ of Black criminality and offender typology. The offender is a stereotypically angry, 
reckless, violent young-Black-male who was raised by a single mother. His offending behaviour 
is equally as predictable: usually involving the possession or trafficking of crack cocaine, 
shootings, homicides, and unlawful possession of firearms and ammunition. CIARs/IRCARs are 
similar to Gladue reports insofar as they are used to provide critical systemic and background 
factors in the sentencing of Black offenders. These reports also address, inter alia, anti-Black 
racism and aim to promote better, more tailored and proportionate sentences for Black offenders. 
They strive to construct a sentencing methodology that balances the significance of the twin 
principles of individual responsibility and proportionality while incorporating the cultural 
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legacies and historical oppressions and their role in the sentencing of Black bodies/offenders. In 
Gladue it was held that “systemic and background factors explain in part the incidence of crime 
and recidivism for non‑aboriginal offenders as well.”287Like Indigenous offenders, the plight of 
African Canadian offenders in the Canadian criminal justice system is well recognized.288The 
aim is not to equate the plight of both groups. Such a conflation would diminish the unique 
relationship that each group has with the State. In Gladue, and later in Wells, and Ipeelee the 
Court affirmed the uniqueness of Indigenous cultures and offenders. The Court’s affirmation of 
this group’s uniqueness is not to be confused as a euphemism for sacredness.289Some critics 
argue that all socially disadvantaged people face similar challenges before sentencing courts and 
therefore, social disadvantage should be the primary factor for consideration.290Recognition of 
race or social disadvantage, however, has largely been rendered hollow by the work of racially 
biased police officers, prosecutors, and judges.  
There is little scholarly and jurisprudential focus on the role that an African Canadian 
offender’s race, colour and ethnicity should or does play in the crafting of a fit and just sentence. 
Some courts have grappled with this issue but with minimal success291, which raises the 
question: is Blackness being discounted at the sentencing stage of the criminal process? 
Alternatively, do we run the risk of reducing Blackness as merely a tool for sentencing 
mitigation? More to the point, does the reliance or utilization of CIARs/IRCARS in the 
sentencing of African Canadian offenders deflect from individual responsibility and 
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proportionality and places undue emphasis on the cultural legacies and historical oppressions, 
mistreatment and disadvantages of African Canadians? There is currently no legislative or 
jurisprudential basis for CIARs/IRCARs; in fact, one of the only favourable judicial treatment of 
this sentencing innovation in Ontario is under appeal.292An IRCAR writer interviewed for this 
project remarked that the outcome of the R v Morris (“Morris”) appeal would either advance 
racial justice for Black Canadians or set this group back 20 years.293She commented that the 
swiftness of the reaction to Morris might necessitate some legislative input or policy shift. One 
of the defence lawyers that was interviewed shared her concern. H.D. commented that while 
positive, IRCARs/CIARS currently rest on unstable jurisprudential ground.294She, however, did 
not take issue with the reasoning in Jackson or Morris; instead, she expressed concern with the 
lack of judicial support since these decisions were rendered.  
Indeed, and as mentioned above, there has been some judicial resistance to these 
decisions in Ontario.295This resistance does not seem to be as pronounced in Nova Scotia, where 
CIARs are routinely accepted in sentencing cases involving African Nova Scotian offenders. 
This willingness may be explained, in part, by the relative homogeneity of the Black Nova 
Scotian population. It is also accepted, despite not being a part of the national narrative, that the 
historic relationship between Canada and Black Nova Scotians was grounded in slavery, 
segregation and other forms anti-Black oppression.296The Black experience in Ontario may be 
slightly different. For instance, most of the Black inhabitants in Ontario are relatively new to 
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Canada compared to their counterparts in Nova Scotia.297Thus, it is perhaps less cumbersome 
and controversial to establish a direct historical link between the State violence and current social 
problems facing Black Nova Scotians. There may, however, be some difficulty in establishing a 
causal link in the case of a recent Black immigrant.298 
Section G: A Long Walk to Jackson 
 
In Borde, the Court of Appeal for Ontario was called upon to interpret, inter alia, the 
parameters of subsection 718.2(e) of the Criminal Code. Specifically, the appellant invited the 
court to consider whether the similarities in the plight of Indigenous peoples and Black 
Canadians warranted a similar methodological approach in the sentencing of both classes of 
offenders as enshrined in subsection 718.2(e) and as outlined in Gladue. The offender, Mr. 
Borde, was 18 years old at the time of the offence and 19 years old when he was sentenced. He 
plead guilty to aggravated assault, possession of a loaded restricted handgun, using a firearm in 
the commission of an indictable offence and breaching his recognizance. In sentencing Mr. 
Borde, the trial judge considered his lengthy youth record, which included entries for violent 
crimes and sentenced him to five years and two months’ imprisonment. Mr. Borde appealed the 
sentencing decision.  
On the appeal, Mr. Borde’s lawyer, David Tanovich, applied to the court to admit fresh 
evidence to inform the court about the systemic and background factors experienced by Black 
males generally in Canada, and those in Toronto’s Regent Park community specifically. The 
court declined to admit the fresh evidence about the systemic racism and background factors 
faced by Black males in Toronto. Moreover, the court reasoned that, despite the importance of 
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these factors in determining a fit and just sentence for Black offenders, they would not affect the 
length of the sentence even if they were considered, given the seriousness of Mr. Borde’s crime. 
The court, however, reduced Mr. Borde’s sentence to four years and two months in light of his 
youth and also given that this was his first penitentiary sentence.  
In Hamilton299, Justice Hill sitting in Brampton – a court that deals with a majority of the 
drug importation cases given its proximity to the Pearson International Airport – accepted the 
guilty plea of Ms. Hamilton, who admitted to swallowing 90 pellets of pure cocaine. She was 
consequently convicted of importing cocaine into Canada. Ms. Hamilton had no criminal 
antecedents. In considering a fit and just sentence, Justice Hill considered her race, gender and 
economic conditions. However, these issues were not raised by counsel. Justice Hill conducted 
his own research into the issue of race, gender, and poverty. He also took judicial notice of the 
fact that a disproportionate amount of the drug “mules” that came before him were poor Black 
mothers. He reasoned that the choices of these women were severely constrained by socio-
economic factors that combined made these women particularly vulnerable to conscription by 
drug dealers to act as couriers. Thus, given society's complicity in the creation of these offenders' 
plight, it was befitting that society bore some of the blame by taking its share of the 
responsibility for the offenders’ offences. Justice Hill sentenced Ms. Hamilton to a conditional 
sentence despite sentencing jurisprudence that required a lengthy penitentiary sentence, given the 
quantity and purity of the drugs imported into Canada by the offenders. The crown appealed the 
sentencing decision to the Ontario Court of Appeal.  
The Court of Appeal, in a decision penned by Justice Doherty, held that Justice Hill 
assumed the combined role of advocate, witness and judge and thereby severely compromised 
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the appearance of judicial impartiality.300Justice Doherty found that it was improper for Justice 
Hill to conduct his own research about issues related to the intersection between race, gender and 
poverty. This duty fell on counsel – not the trial judge. If the trial judge had concerns about these 
issues, then it should be raised with counsel who will determine whether those issues are 
germane to the case. It is improper for the trial judge to inject himself into the proceedings. The 
Court of Appeal concluded that the trial judge erred in sentencing the offenders to conditional 
sentences and reasoned that, where the offence is sufficiently serious, imprisonment will be the 
only reasonable response regardless of the ethnic or cultural background of the offender. Ms. 
Hamilton’s sentence was altered to 20 months incarceration. However, the court determined that 
the ends of justice would be served by allowing her to complete her conditional sentence, as 
opposed to imprisonment for the few months that remained on her sentence.301 
Hamilton was a watershed case insofar as it was one of the first appellate decision to 
consider how judicial perceptions of Blackness should inform sentencing outcomes. The 
sentencing judge determined that, given structural racism, the accused’s level of moral 
blameworthiness was attenuated. Thus, he sentenced the accused to a conditional sentence even 
though the sentencing range for cocaine importation, particularly of that purity level, was a 
                                                          
300 Hamilton, supra note 42 at 33. 
301 In R v Spencer, 2004 CanLII 5550 (ON CA) the trial court judge applied Justice Hill’s reasoning in his sentencing 
of Ms. Spencer. Ms. Spencer was found guilty of importing a large quantity of cocaine into Canada from Jamaica. 
The trial judge, relying on Justice Hill’s decision in Hamilton, held that Ms. Spencer, a poor Black single mother, 
was the victim of systemic racism and gender discrimination which played a role in the commission of the crime. 
Taking these issues, inter alia, into account, the trial judge imposed a conditional sentence of two years less a day. 
The Crown appealed to the Court of Appeal for Ontario. This case was heard on the same day as Hamilton and was 
also penned by Justice Doherty. The court found that the trial judge erred in considering systemic racial and gender 
bias in determining an appropriate sentence. The court explained that the mitigating factors could not justify the 
sentence, given the seriousness of the offence. Furthermore, the trial judge had no evidence to suggest that Ms. 
Spencer was in dire financial straits. The court also found that it was improper for the trial judge to consider the 
collateral immigration consequences that Ms. Spencer would face if she was sentenced to term of imprisonment that 
exceed two years less a day.  The court determined that a sentence of 40 months’ incarceration would have been 
appropriate. After applying credit for the 16 months that was completed out of her conditional sentence, the court 
varied her sentence to 20 months’ incarceration. 
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significant penitentiary sentence. As discussed above, the sentence was overturned on appeal, 
and the sentencing judge was sharply rebuked for his purported judicial activism. Following 
Hamilton, a small, but spirited, discussion emerged about the relationship between Blackness 
and the institution of criminal sentencing.302Richard F. Devlin and Matthew Sherrard argued that 
the decision would have a chilling effect on any subsequent cases dealing with social context 
evidence, particularly in cases involving Black offenders.303The authors predicted that other 
judges in similar cases would be unlikely to act on social context evidence. They asserted that 
Hamilton would serve to limit the use of social context in cases of systemic and intersectional 
inequality. The decision limits the judicial function (how judges should conduct themselves in 
court if there is concern about social context) in cases that require judges to consider the 
systemic and background factors of the offender. Moreover, the appeal court’s criticism of the 
sentencing judge neglects the fact that the sentencing judge found the authority to raise social 
context from the Constitution, Criminal Code, and the common law. 
 According to the authors, the Court over-emphasizes the particularity of Aboriginal 
peoples and ignored the fact that other vulnerable communities also suffer from intersectional 
inequality. The authors agreed, however, that the sentencing judge presumed the generic applied 
to the specific. Moreover, he failed to establish a sufficient evidentiary link between the 
offender’s race, gender, and class and the offence.304The authors’ warning proved prophetic 
insofar as Hamilton did result in a chill on future cases raising social context evidence in cases 
                                                          
302Daniel J. Song & Christine Boyle, “When Race Matters in Sentencing: R. v. Ramsay and R. v. Hamilton, 22 C.R. 
(6th) 86; Sonia N. Lawrence & Toni Williams, supra note 20; Carmela Murdocca, supra note 235; H. Archibald 
Kaiser, "Borde and Hamilton: Facing the Uncomfortable Truth About Inequality, Discrimination and General 
Deterrence" (2003) 8 C.R. (6th) 289; Michael Plaxton, “Nagging Doubts About the Use of Race (and Racism) in 
Sentencing” (2003) 8 C.R. (6th) 299; Jennifer J. Llewellyn, Restorative Justice in Borde and Hamilton — A 
Systemic Problem? (2003) 8 C.R. (6th) 308; David M. Tanovich, supra note 20; Richard F. Devlin & Matthew 
Sherrard, “The Big Chill?: Contextual Judgment after R. v. Hamilton and Mason” (2005) 28 Dalhousie L.J. 409. 
303 Richard F. Devlin & Matthew Sherrard, supra note 299. 
304See generally, ibid. 
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where these systemic and background factors were germane in the determination of an 
appropriate sentence.305However, the wounds from the past are still raw and visible. In some 
regard, we have not experienced a full thaw. To date, only a few cases have considered 
Blackness in the sentencing context. A detailed analysis of some of these cases will be provided 
below. Unlike Hamilton, this new generation of cases aims to avoid the pitfalls of their 
predecessors. For example, painstaking detail is placed on providing an evidentiary nexus 
between the condition of Blackness and the offence and the offender’s personal responsibility. 
Defence lawyers deploy CIARs/IRCARs as a means of providing an evidence-based assessment 
of blameworthiness. It is arguable that defence lawyers have travelled a long distance from 
Hamilton. 
Section H: Doctrinal Review (Nova Scotian Cases) 
 
R v “X” is the first case to use a CIAR. In that case, X, a sixteen (16) year old Black 
youth shot his fifteen (15) year old cousin in the stomach with a hunting rifle in an attempt to kill 
him. He was convicted of attempted murder. The Crown applied to have X sentenced as an adult. 
Defence counsel argued that X should be sentenced as a young person pursuant to subsection 
42(2) (o) of the Youth Criminal Justice Act.306Defence counsel also invited the court to consider 
X’s race and culture in determining the appropriate sentence. This is not the first case where a 
court had been invited to consider the impact of race and culture in the sentencing of Black 
offenders.307It was, however, the first time that a Canadian court was invited to consider race and 
culture in the context of a Black youth offender in determining the appropriateness of imposing 
an adult sentence. Defence counsel applied to have Mr. Robert Wright, a registered social 
                                                          
305 A review of the reported sentencing cases revealed that it was not until 2014 in Nova Scotia and 2018 in Ontario 
that Lawyers began to raise the social and cultural context of their Black clients in sentencing hearings. 
306 Youth Criminal Justice Act, SC 2002, c 1. (“YCJA”) 
307 Hamilton, supra note 42.  
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worker, qualified as an expert on race and culture. Following a lengthy voir dire, Judge Anne S. 
Derrick (as she then was) qualified Mr. Wright as an expert and permitted him to provide expert 
testimony about race and culture, specifically how these factors impacted on X’s life. Judge 
Derrick found that Mr. Wright’s testimony and report provided her with: 
a more textured, multi-dimensional framework for understanding X, his background and 
his behaviours. “X” has been both a perpetrator and a victim of violence in the context of 
his criminally-impacted community. Mr. Wright’s evidence gives me a lens through 
which to view “X” in determining this application. And it suggests that “X”‘s character 
and maturity are still in a formative stage. Mr. Wright encountered a significantly 
conflicted young person, still located in his loving, pro-social family, who is struggling 
with his identity in the context of a criminally-impacted community that has incubated 
mistrust, rivalries, and violence.308 
Judge Derrick rejected the Crown’s application and sentenced X to a youth sentence pursuant to 
the applicable subsection of the YCJA. She emphasized X’s “immaturity, heightened 
vulnerability and reduced capacity for moral judgement.”309She also reasoned that an adult 
sentence would derail X’s life and “undermine the potential for him to change.”310Judge Derrick 
also canvassed some of the work done by the Correctional Investigator on the status of racialized 
offenders in the Federal prison system. She found that the Federal system did not provide 
adequate opportunities for racialized offenders to participate in culturally relevant 
programming.311This was an essential feature of X’s rehabilitative plan that could not be 
facilitated in the Federal system. These programs, however, were available in the youth 
correction institution in Nova Scotia.312 Judge Derrick ultimately sentenced X to a three (3) year 
Custody and Supervision Order (CSO).  
                                                          
308 R v “X”, supra note 41 at 198. 
309 Ibid at 265. 
310Ibid at 252.  
311 Ibid at 256-259.  
312 See also In J.C. (Re), 2017 NSPC 14 (CanLII) the provincial director made an Application to transfer the 
offender to adult facility to finish his youth sentence. Defence counsel argued that no culturally appropriate or 
relevant programming existed in the adult facility. The defence relied on the evidence of race and culture expert. Her 
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In the sentencing cases of R v E. S.313, R v R.D. 314 and R v D.B.315, the three-youth co-
accused pleaded guilty to an armed home invasion robbery, which resulted in three young people 
being shot. One of the victims was rendered a quadriplegic. Interestingly, R.D. was X’s victim. 
He was shot by X a year and a half before he participated in the armed home invasion robbery. 
The Crown did not seek an adult sentence given that none of the co-accused was the shooter and 
their respective degrees of participation. In each case Judge Derrick was invited to consider the 
Blackness and Indigeneity of the co-accused. Each of the co-accused, while being raised in Black 
communities and families, claimed Aboriginal heritage. Gladue reports were ordered in each 
case. However, the reports were unable to conclude with certainty the authenticity of R.D. and 
D.B.’s claim of Aboriginal heritage. Judge Derrick was also invited to consider the co-accused 
Blackness. Her Honour held as she did in R v X, that race and culture are relevant considerations 
in sentencing. Each of the co-accused benefited from the presumption of diminished culpability 
by virtue of their youth. The systemic and background factors that have affected the lives of the 
co-accused does not diminish their level of accountability. Judge Derrick explained that “the 
emphasis on accountability is not diminished by considerations of D.(R.)’s experience as a 
racialized youth drawn into the orbit of criminally-inclined peers. It is informed by this 
reality”.316She further explained that R.D.’s:  
moral culpability and his rehabilitation and reintegration must be examined through the 
lens of his racialization and his experiences as a member of a community where criminal 
activity has been, to some extent, normalized for him. The normalization of criminal 
activity and association was heightened by D.(R.)’s experience as a victim of violence in 
his community.317 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
honour, Judge Derrick (as she then was) said it was in the public’s interest to grant the Director’s Application to 
have the offender transferred to adult facility to his finish youth sentence. 
313 2015 NSPC 81 (CanLII). 
314 2015 NSPC 83 (CanLII). 
315 2015 NSPC 82 (CanLII). 
316 2015 NSPC 83 (CanLII) at 97. 
317 2015 NSPC 83 (CanLII) at 95; see also 2015 NSPC 82 (CanLII) at 101; 2015 NSPC 81 (CanLII) at 117. 
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Judge Derrick sentenced R.D. to 260 days CSO and 12 months’ probation. She sentenced both 
co-accused to 267 days CSO and 12 months’ probation. 
In R v N.W.318 the youth offender was tried and convicted of first-degree murder in the 
shooting death of another young person. N.W. was seventeen years old at the time of the murder. 
The Crown applied to have N.W. sentenced as an adult. Similar to the reasoning in X, Judge 
Buckle held that “young people are entitled to a presumption of diminished moral 
blameworthiness because of their age, which results in a heightened vulnerability, less maturity, 
and reduced capacity for moral judgment.”319She further added that “evidence of race and culture 
was relevant to the determination of whether the presumption of diminished moral 
blameworthiness or culpability had been rebutted.”320However, Judge Buckle held that 
“concluding that race and culture are relevant doesn’t answer the question of how to use that 
information in deciding whether to impose an adult sentence.”321She questioned whether this 
information should arbitrarily diminish a Black offender’s moral culpability. Her honour relied 
on Justice Lebel’s reasoning on this subject, albeit made in the context of indigeneity, and held 
that an offender’s “moral culpability is potentially diminished because of the “constrained 
circumstances” which they may have found themselves in because of the operation of systemic 
and background factors that are connected to their race and cultural background”.322She 
ultimately dismissed the Crown’s application and sentenced N.W. to a youth sentence.  
The above cases dealt with youth offenders, who not only benefit from the presumption 
of diminished moral blameworthiness but are also sentenced differently than their similarly 
                                                          
318 2018 NSPC 14. 
319 2018 NSPC 14 at 18. 
320 2018 NSPC 14 at 28. 
321 2018 NSPC 14 at 33. 
322 2018 NSPC 14 at 35. 
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situated adult counterparts. The case of R v. Gabriel323involved an adult offender. The facts of 
the case are eerily similar to the youth cases discussed above and those that will follow. The 
offender, Kale Gabriel, was convicted of second-degree murder by a jury in the shooting death of 
his cousin, Ryan White. He was 22 years old when he killed Ryan. Pursuant to section 235 of the 
Criminal Code he was sentenced to imprisonment for life. The only issue that remained to be 
determined by the court was the period of parole ineligibility.324Defence counsel asked the court 
to consider both a CIAR and Gladue report given Kyle’s mixed Black and Aboriginal 
heritage.325Justice Campbell explained that: 
Aboriginal offenders are treated differently. The Cultural Assessment in this case does 
not have the same constitutional implications as a Gladue report. But that doesn’t mean it 
isn’t vitally important. It is a historical fact and present reality that African Nova Scotians 
were and continue to be discriminated against. As the criminal justice system must take 
into account the overrepresentation of Aboriginal people in custody, it must also take into 
account the effects of discrimination on members of the African Nova Scotian 
community.326 
 
He further added that the CIAR, similar to a Gladue report, “does not provide a justification for a 
lighter sentence. Like a Gladue report it might prompt the consideration of restorative justice 
options where those are appropriate. It doesn’t position the offender as helpless victim of 
historical circumstances.”327After a review of the applicable case law, Justice Campbell set the 
period of parole ineligibility at thirteen (13) years.  
                                                          
323 2017 NSSC 90 (CanLII) (“Gabriel”). See also R v Riley, 2019 NSSC 92. Here, the offender was convicted of 2nd 
degree murder and was sentenced to life imprisonment. The only issue for determination was his period of parole 
ineligibility. Defence counsel submitted an IRCA report. The court found it helpful in outlining the offender’s 
complicated background. Ultimately, the court found that a period of 15 years parole ineligibility was appropriate. 
324 Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c C-46 at section 745. 
325 See also R v Perry 2018 NSSC 16, where the mixed race (Aboriginal and Black) offender pleaded guilty to a 
number of weapon offences. Defence filed both an IRCA and Gladue Reports. The court found that rehabilitation 
was the key objective of sentence given the offender’s Indigenous (para 76). The court relied heavily on Mr. Perry’s 
indigenous ancestry given the specific references in the code and the case law. He was sentenced to time served and 
house arrest.   
326 2017 NSSC 90 (CanLII) at para 49. 
327 2017 NSSC 90 (CanLII) at 90. 
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In R v Downey the offender, Devon Downey, pled guilty to manslaughter for punching 
the victim, Kaylin Diggs rendering him unconscious, which caused Kaylin to fall and fatally hit 
his head on the ground. Devon, who was 25 years old at the time of the offence, had no criminal 
record and was leading a pro-social life. He was not a good student but only managed to 
complete grade 11. However, Devon benefitted from having community mentors and a stable 
home life. He is also the father of two young children. The fight that led to the death of Kaylin 
began as brawl in the downtown entertainment district. Kaylin was not the aggressor. He 
intervened to assist his friend and was punched by Devon and hit the ground and died. Defence 
counsel asked the court to consider Devon’s race and culture in determining an appropriate 
sentence. In the CIAR, the writer discussed the cultural code of young Black men in Halifax. 
This cultural code involved “resolving social injustice by not leaving, backing down or being 
punked out, being unconsciously hyper-vigilant to potential conflicts.”328Justice Rosinski held 
that: 
in the circumstances of this case, there was no social injustice trigger; no racial or 
discriminatory [black versus white] trigger evident; no realistic need to be hyper-vigilant, 
given that I have concluded that Mr. Downey was in the company Michael Chisholm who 
was fighting Cody Good, surrounded by 8 to 10 of their friends, when Mr. Diggs, an 
African-Nova Scotian male of similar age, arrived at the fight to assess his friend Cody 
Good’s situation. None of the foregoing factors could realistically be said to play any role 
in Mr. Downey’s striking Mr. Diggs.329 
 
The Crown argued for a seven (7) year prison sentence. While the defence argued for a sentence 
of two (2) to three (3) year sentence. Justice Rosinski sentenced Devon to four (4) years 
imprisonment. However, he endorsed the warrant of committal to ensure that Correctional 
Services Canada considered Devon for “psychotherapy and psycho-educational programming; as 
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well as programming regarding Mr. Downey’s mental health, particularly by assessors who are 
sensitive to his cultural and racial background as an African-Nova Scotian.”330 
Section I: Doctrinal Review (Ontario Cases) 
 
As discussed above, scholars warned of the impact that Hamilton would have on the 
adducing of social context evidence in sentencing. The prediction proved to be accurate, given 
that lawyers have only recently begun to raise in sentencing hearings the social and cultural 
context of their Black clients. Unlike Nova Scotia, IRCARs have not been widely used in 
Ontario. Of the reported cases, only three (3) decisions benefitted from the use of an IRCAR.331 
The other cases, except for R v Reid, referred to or relied on, Jackson332, which was the first case 
in Ontario to consider an IRCA report.  
In Jackson, Justice Nakatsuru, focused on the accused, Jamaal Jackson’s, Blackness, and 
how that fact should inform his sentence. Justice Nakatsuru began his judgement by 
acknowledging that African Canadians are overrepresented in jails and decided to use the 
opportunity to make “small step in changing that.”333He did warn, however, that sentencing is an 
individualized process that is designed to achieve proportionality. Jamaal is of mixed Black and 
Aboriginal heritage. However, he identifies as being Black. He is originally from Nova Scotia.  
At the time of sentencing hearing he was 33 years old. Jamaal has a lengthy criminal record. The 
police intercepted communication between Jamaal and another person making arrangements to 
purchase a firearm. A warrant was sought and authorized. The Police went to Jamaal’s home and 
searched him incident to arrest and discovered a gun with one bullet in the chamber. At the time, 
                                                          
330 2017 NSSC 203 at 34. See also R v Boutilier where the offender was sentenced to 7.5 years imprisonment for 
vehicular homicide. The defence relied on both an IRCA and Gladue reports on account of Mr. Boutilier mixed 
heritage. The court at para 59 held that the offender “shall be afforded the counselling and other therapeutic 
remedies recommended by the authors of the Gladue and IRCA reports as available while in custody”. 
331 Jackson, supra note 42; Morris, supra note 279; R v T.J.T., 2018 ONSC 5280  
332 Jackson, ibid. 
333 Ibid at 2 and 4. 
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Jamaal was subject to five weapons prohibitions. He pled guilty to the offences. Justice 
Nakatsuru relied on both the IRCA report and his own judicial notice of systemic racism and 
other factors that plague African Canadians.334The crown sought an 8.5-10-year sentence, while 
the defence sought a 4-year sentence. He was sentenced to 6 years imprisonment.  
In Jackson, Justice Nakatsuru provided a framework for sentencing Black offenders in 
Ontario.335He rejected the defence’s invitation to formulate a sentencing methodology similar to 
the one used for Indigenous offenders. Instead, he grounded his methodology in the sentencing 
principles already enshrined in the Criminal Code. Moreover, he also rejected the notion that 
expert evidence is mandatory, whether in the form of an IRCA report or viva voce evidence from 
a ‘race and culture’ expert. The court found that judicial notice of the conditions facing Black 
people across Canada and how those conditions may impact the offender before the court is 
sufficient. However, it was held that the accused need not establish a direct link between anti-
Black racism/background factors and the crime.336 Justice Lemay rejected this holding in R v 
Brissett and Francis. In that case, the court found that the ruling in Hamilton required some 
direct link between the social deprivation and the crime or the offender.337 In R v Williams, 
Justice Hill explained that the: 
court’s dicta in Hamilton is best understood to mean that the record before the court ought 
to raise this issue from the general to the specific in the sense of some evidence, direct or 
                                                          
334 Jackson, ibid at 82: Nakatsuru J. stated: I find that for African Canadians, the time has come where I as a 
sentencing judge must take judicial notice of such matters as the history of colonialism (in Canada and elsewhere), 
slavery, policies and practices of segregation, intergenerational trauma, and racism both overt and systemic as they 
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See R v Find, 2001 SCC 32, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 863, at 48-49; R v Sutherland, 2016 ONCA 674, 342 C.C.C. (3d) 309 
at 35; Alan W. Bryant, Michelle Fuerst & Sidney N. Lederman, The Law of Evidence in Canada, 5 th ed. (Toronto: 
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335 See also Morris, supra note 279.  
336Jackson, supra note 42 at 111. 
337 R v Brissett and Francis, supra note 279 at 69. 
82 
 
inferential, that racial disadvantage is linked to constraint of a particular offender’s 
choices and to his life experience in bringing him before the court.338  
 
In Morris, Nakatsuru J., relying largely on his analysis in Jackson, sentenced the accused to a 15-
month sentence for gun possession. That sentence was lowered to 12 months after the judge 
found that the police breached the accused’s Charter rights during his arrest when the police 
officer drove the police car over the accused’s foot. Like Jackson, the court took judicial notice 
of systemic anti-Black racism and relied heavily on the IRCA report filed by the accused. The 
court found that the impact of systemic anti-Black racism on the accused should mitigate the 
sentence imposed. He also characterized the sentenced as “lenient” and added that some people 
might consider the accused as an unworthy candidate for such a low sentence. The judge 
commented that the accused’s decision to pick up a gun was a consequence of oppression, 
despair and disadvantage.339  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
338 R v Williams, 2018 ONSC 5409 (CanLII) at para 45; See also Hamilton, Supra note 42 at para. 133; R v Brissett 
and Francis, supra note 279 at 60-62; R v Nimaga, 2018 ONCJ 795, 151 W.C.B. (2d) 247, at 45; R v Peazer, [2003] 
O.J. No. 6283 (Ont. S.C.J.), at 56-59; R v Downey, 2017 NSSC 302, 143 W.C.B. (2d) 416, at 10; see however, the 
opposite result in the context of Aboriginal offenders (R v F.H.L., 2018 ONCA 83, 360 C.C.C. (3d) 189 at  40-42);  
339 Morris, supra note 279 at 83-84.  
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Chapter Four: Mobilizing Blackness During Sentencing  
 
Section A: The Paradox of Visibility 
 
In all the cases reviewed above, the offenders sought to have the sentencing judge focus 
on their Blackness. Some legal scholars, particularly Tanovich, hypothesize that anti-Blackness 
in the criminal justice system can be remedied by increasing the visibility of Blackness/race.340It 
is posited that the erasure of race perpetuates racism by blocking opportunities for meaningful 
engagement with race-based claims. There is, perhaps, cogent reasons to suggest that by 
highlighting race, judges will be provided with a fulsome understanding of the salient issues in 
dispute. Indeed, race talk may encourage a judge to grapple with issues that are often deemed 
taboo, or within the province of social scientists and legislators. It may also inspire judicial 
examination of identity and, perhaps more importantly, a reckoning of how a particular judge has 
previously analyzed race. Judges are not immune to common suppositions about race, culture 
and belonging.341A judicial appointment does not automatically ‘wipe’ entrenched notions, 
attitudes and behaviours. Such an expectation would be unreasonable and naive. What is instead 
required is adherence to and respect for the law and prevailing standards of decency. However, 
like laypeople, judges may, at times, whether consciously or unconsciously access and rely on 
entrenched suppositions.342This kind of autonomic thinking is rampant in the policing of Black 
bodies.343 
                                                          
340 David M. Tanovich, supra note 131; David M Tanovich, “The Charter of Whiteness: Twenty-Five Years of 
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In the case of judges, it may be challenging to detect whether racism motivated their 
decision. While judges are held to a high standard of fairness, it is unreasonable to believe that 
they are not similarly laden with pernicious racial presuppositions. It is, however, impermissible 
for them to rely on these suppositions in their decision-making. In order to avoid claims of bias, 
Judges must strive for impartiality and aim to disabuse themselves of such notions. It is 
questionable whether judges are capable of thoroughly disabusing themselves of these 
suppositions. Is it possible, however, that a bombardment of race talk may inadvertently trigger a 
judge’s deeply held preconceived notions about Blackness? One may argue that these beliefs and 
experiences may provide a lens through which a judge can analyze a problematic issue. The 
problem arises, however, when these experiences, and beliefs are given precedence over the 
evidence tendered by the parties to the dispute, or if they lead to a reasonable apprehension of 
bias. 
In Hamilton, Justice Hill, frustrated with the conspicuous efforts of lawyers to silence the 
issue of race, class and gender in drug importation cases, decided to raise the issue himself. Not 
only did he take judicial notice of this phenomenon, he also conducted extensive research and 
adduced his findings into evidence. Hamilton provides an excellent example of a judicial over-
correction of the over-punishment of Black female bodies.344Justice Hill endeavoured sought to 
increase the visibility of a phenomenon that he considered to be a severe problem in Black 
communities. He essentially turned Ms. Hamilton’s sentencing hearing into platform from where 
race talk, particularly around race, gender and class, could take flight. As noted above, this 
decision was met with swift rebuke from the Court of Appeal. Justice Hill may be credited, 
however, for highlighting a grave issue in some Black communities, namely drug trafficking, 
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and, more importantly, the state’s response to it.345However, his laudable approach may have had 
unintentional consequences insofar as it may have reinforced stereotypes around Blackness and 
the drug trade. A similar argument can be made about the reported CIARs/IRCARs cases in that 
they primarily mobilize race in situations involving serious gun and drug violence. To date, there 
are no reported IRCAR/CIAR cases that mobilize race in the context of a less serious crime. 
Admittedly, it would be deemed unreasonable to presuppose that Blackness is not an essential 
factor in sentencing cases involving theft, impaired driving, or other offences not typically 
associated with Black people. It is disturbing that Blackness is primarily being raised in the 
context of serious and violent crimes where both the victim and the offender are Black 
Canadians.  
Moreover, because Blackness is stereotypically associated with gun and drug crimes, 
defence lawyers must be careful that this association does not inadvertently get reinforced 
through a practice of using CIARs/IRCARS in primarily gun and drug cases. In these cases, 
judges are provided with a biographical sketch of the offender’s journey through Blackness. 
Defence lawyers invite judges to draw connections between the offender’s journey and his 
unfortunate destination. These reports are deployed as a means of connecting the offender’s 
Blackness and the offence, which is done in order to conduct a better assessment of moral 
blameworthiness. In some sense, Blackness is coopted and used as a yardstick to measure blame. 
The more egregious the Black experience, the less morally blameworthy is the offender for his 
crime. Therefore, formulating a wretched Black experience may be instrumental in securing a 
positive sentencing outcome. This approach may require an offender to perform a certain type of 
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Blackness. One that is tragic and pathological but may increase the chances of diminishing moral 
blameworthiness.  
Consequently, the most wretched embodiment of Blackness is put on display in order to 
evoke a particular emotive response from a sentencing judge. The more pitiful the narrative, the 
higher the probability of a favourable outcome. Thus, all attempts at erasing race are countered 
by over-emphasizing the salience of race. The Blackness of the offender must become 
undeniably visible, which will presumably force judicial engagement. It is unclear, however, that 
increased judicial engagement with race will reduce the over-incarceration of Black Canadians. 
Indeed, as it is colloquially stated: talk may be cheap. Without concrete action, for example, 
judicial willingness to incorporate, as Steiker puts it, robust mercy, as a countervailing method of 
correcting the impulse to over-punish, visibility may be rendered hollow.346In some sense, 
performing Blackness as a means of mitigating punishment involves self-degradation.347 
However, it is controversial if mercy and justice can co-exist in a retributive sentencing 
paradigm.348Perhaps even more controversial is whether mercy and Blackness can co-exist. 
 It is unclear whether the goal of CIARs/IRCARs is to generate proportionate sentences 
or disproportionately low sentences that promote countervailing goals. Put another way, can 
IRCARs/CIARs be construed as a plea for mercy? Moreover, if so, is this a dignifying aim given 
that some Black offenders desire colour-blind treatment by sentencing judges. One might even 
argue that the whole purpose of CIARs/IRCARs is to ask judges to focus on the colour of the 
accused’s skin so that they will focus on the content of the accused’s character. This approach is 
                                                          
346 Carol Steiker, “The Mercy Seat: Discretion, Justice, and Mercy in the American Criminal Justice System”, supra 
note 222; Carol Steiker, “Criminalization and the Criminal Process: Prudential Mercy as a Limit on Penal Sanctions 
in an Era of Mass Incarceration” supra note 226. 
347 James Q. Whitman, supra note 183 at 32-39. 
348 R A Duff, supra note 230. A more fulsome treatment of mercy is provided below. For now, it is important to 
discuss how Blackness can be harnessesd to reduce blameworthiness. 
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challenging, and maybe even paradoxical manoeuvre – but it may also be a logical one, insofar 
as we are operating within the cruel illogic of white supremacy.349 
In a proportionality-based sentencing regime, punishment is allocated in correspondence 
with desert/blame.350Thus, any attempts at sentence mitigation must demonstrate how the 
offender’s degree of blame can be attenuated. Given the supposed pathologies associated with 
Blackness, the offender’s race may provide the perfect scapegoat. It is not the offender, per se, 
that deserves blame – but rather his Blackness. He, therefore, cannot be held solely responsible 
for his conduct, because but for his miserable experiences, he would not have chosen that 
particular path. In other words, his choices were constrained by a society infected with anti-
Black racism. Thus, society deserves some, if not most, of the blame. It follows that a 
proportionate sentence must apportion blame in a fashion that compensates the offender for the 
structural violence levelled against him. A Black offender embodies the status of both victim and 
offender.351Therefore, he must not be made to pay for conduct that was the inexorable result of 
his attempts at surviving a structurally racist society. This supposition poses a problem, however, 
namely: how does one measure the amount of the offender’s conduct that was motivated by free-
will and the amount that was the consequence of structural violence? There is no accepted 
scientific method used in criminal sentencing to parse blame.352The proportionality analysis is 
                                                          
349 David M Tanovich, “The Charter of Whiteness: Twenty-Five Years of Maintaining Racial Injustice in the 
Canadian Criminal Justice System”, supra note 5; Elizabeth Sheehy, “Equality and Supreme Court Criminal 
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350 Mirko Bagaric, “Proportionality in Sentencing: Its Justification, Meaning and Role” (2000)12:2 Current Issues 
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351Wesley Crichlow, supra note 188; 
 Scot Wortley, supra note 139; See generally Paul Butler, supra note 50; Raff Donelson, supra note 134; Tommie 
Shelby, supra note 134. 
352 This statement does not suggest that scientific reports or evidence used to assit judges understand the entire 
context of the situation and the offender is not a tool for assessing moral blameworthiness. What I am arguing, 
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relied upon to perform that function. There are two points on the proportionality scale – 
seriousness of the offence and the offender’s level of moral blameworthiness. With regard to the 
former, as highlighted above, many of the IRCAR/CIAR cases involved serious and violent 
offences. Thus, it is the latter point of the scale that is often in contention.  
Human beings are the product of many competing and incongruent forces. Therefore, 
there is serious doubt around the feasibility of a linear theory of criminality.353Unfortunately, 
Blackness is often unfairly proffered as an arrow to criminality. While there exist, no scientific 
studies evincing such a connection, there is nonetheless a prevailing pseudo-scientific notion that 
Black bodies are prone to criminality. Proponents of IRCARs/CIARs may run the risk of 
reinforcing this belief when Blackness is routinely offered as an excuse or an explanation for an 
offender’s conduct. Such an approach sacrifices Blackness for sentencing expediency. The 
concern is that a particular type of Blackness: one that is tragic and pathological - is provided as 
the lens through which to analyze an offender’s conduct. There are cogent reasons to suggest that 
this approach may actually reinforce already entrenched notions of Black criminality. Many of 
the ex-offenders interviewed for this project were opposed to the idea of offering race as an 
explanation for their conduct. One ex-offender interviewee remarked that “if I did the crime, then 
my race shouldn’t matter.”354Many of the ex-offenders desired to be treated similar to white 
offenders. It appeared that whiteness in their eyes was a barometer for fair treatment. In some 
sense, they desired to have their race remain neutral – invisible.355This quest for invisibility, 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
however, is that their is no independent appartus, for example a risk tool, which is used in some States in the United 
States, to parse blame in a mechanical or computerized fashion. 
353See generally Lee E. Ross, “A Vision of Race, Crime and Justice Through the Lens of Critical Race Theory” in 
Eugene McLaughlin & Tim Newburn, SAGE Handbook of Criminological Theory, ed, (SAGE Publications Ltd, 
2010) 391. 
354 M.W. is a 38-year-old Black male. This is direct quote. 
355 For another account on visibility, See generally Ralph Ellison, Invisible Man, (NewYork: Random house, 
1947).In this book, Ellison equates invisibility with race, and specifically Blackness, in the sense that everything 
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however, may be futile. It is also problematic to imagine that equality may only be achieved 
when race is rendered invisible. This is the paradox confronting critical race lawyers and 
scholars, namely: when is it appropriate or desirable to make race visible? In the eyes of the ex-
offenders, the answer is obvious – they did not see value in making their race visible. Indeed, 
they perceived their race as being an obstacle to fair treatment. The ex-offenders expressed a 
concern that Franz Fanon aptly explained in his book, Back Skins White Masks: 
and already I am being dissected under white eyes, the only real eyes. I am fixed. Having 
adjusted their microtomes, they objectively cut away slices of my reality. I am laid bare. I 
feel, I see in those white faces that it is not a new man who has come in, but a new kind of 
man, a new genus. Why, it's a Negro! 
I slip into corners, I remain silent, I strive for anonymity, for invisibility. Look, I will 
accept the lot, as long as no one notices me. 
My blackness was there, dark and unarguable. And it tormented me, pursued me, 
disturbed me, angered me. Negroes are savages, brutes, illiterates.356 
 
Fanon’s explication of Blackness lends support to the ex-offenders’ apprehensions around race 
visibility. It can be traumatic for some offenders to witness and participate in, the magnification 
of their Blackness in a courtroom setting, where they are already viscerally aware of their 
Blackness, and of the fact that Blackness typically operates against people’s favour in our courts 
and society.357Blackness is always present. It, however, becomes more prominent in the sight of 
whiteness. In those moments, Blackness is transformed – mutated into something, that despite 
being unrecognizable to most Black Canadians, nonetheless demands recognition. The Black 
body becomes of a site of constant reconfiguration in both meaning and identity. It is contorted 
at a whim to ever-changing demands on Black identity. Indeed, to exist in Black skin is a 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
about his individuality and character is obscured and rendered invisible by virtue of his skin. He writes, “I am 
invisible, understand, simply because people refuse to see me. Like the bodiless heads you see sometimes in circus 
sideshows, it is as though I have been surrounded by mirrors of hard, distorting glass. When they approach me they 
see only my surroundings, themselves or figments of their imagination, indeed, everything and anything except me.” 
On this reading, Black people who want to be treated as white do not want to be invisible; they want to be visible in 
the way that white people are – as persons in our society who are seen as individuals, and not as cyphers or 
placeholders onto which we project a standardized set of characteristics.  
356Frantz Fanon, Black Skin, White Masks, (London: Pluto Press, 1952) at 116-117. 
357Sherene Razack, supra note 346. 
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continuous struggle between the desire for free expression and predestination. As Fanon 
explains: 
when the black man, who has never felt as much a "Negro" as he has under white 
domination, decides to prove his culture and act as a cultivated person, he realizes that 
history imposes on him a terrain already mapped out, that history sets him along a very 
precise path and that he is expected to demonstrate the existence of a "Negro" culture.358 
 
What Fanon describes can only be understood as an affront to the dignity and free will of Black 
peoples. Black Canadians’ free will is constrained through the mechanism of anti-Black racism 
and other forms of structural violence. They inhabit foreign bodies that are not of their creation. 
Black bodies are, in one sense, alien but have nevertheless managed to replace and suppress the 
Black aesthetic of another time, or that exist in the minds and souls of Black peoples. This 
constructed “Blackness” provides the only visible, tangible representation of Blackness. What 
resides inside the mind and soul of Black peoples is deemed fictional or worse, valueless, which 
may lend support for the ex-offenders’ reluctance to engage with their Blackness during 
sentencing. The Blackness on display is not their own, but despite its origins, they are viscerally 
aware that it is this image of Blackness that has been engrafted on them. It is now their burden to 
bear. 
 W.E.B Du Bois posited that Black people embody a sort of double-consciousness. He 
remarked that:  
after the Egyptian and Indian, the Greek and Roman, the Teuton and Mongolian, the 
Negro is a sort of seventh son, born with a veil, and gifted with second-sight in this 
American world, -- a world which yields him no true self-consciousness, but only lets him 
see himself through the revelation of the other world. It is a peculiar sensation, this 
double-consciousness, this sense of always looking at one's self through the eyes of 
others, of measuring one's soul by the tape of a world that looks on in amused contempt 
and pity. One ever feels his twoness, -- an American, a Negro; two souls, two thoughts, 
two unreconciled strivings; two warring ideals in one dark body, whose dogged strength 
alone keeps it from being torn asunder.359 
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Du Bois exposition of double-consciousness is as accurate today as it was when he wrote it. 
Black offenders who come before white sentencing judges must attend to both these realities. 
Their self-perception is arguably given value through the eyes of another. Therefore, it may be 
prudent to obscure the gaze of the judge by focusing the judge’s attention away from 
Blackness.360IRCARs/CIARs do the opposite. They purposely place Blackness in the judge’s 
direct line of sight to encourage him or her to examine issues of identity and race and their 
relevance in criminal sentencing. This approach is not without risk. As Razack argues: 
unlikely to acknowledge their oppressive practices, dominant groups merely deny that 
such practices exist. To insist on being seen, that is, to contest the dominant group's 
perception is - for an oppressed person -to be smashed in the process by a wall of denial 
that makes of one's existence an illusion, an imagined story of unfairness and injustice.361 
 
Indeed, there exists a sort of paradox inherent within the visibility-invisibility dichotomy. To 
desire acknowledgement is to risk denial, derision and unfair treatment, whereas invisibility 
serves to perpetuate injustice. Proponents of sentencing reform via IRCARs/CIARs presuppose 
that the principle of judicial impartiality will provide a shield against the sting of anti-Blackness. 
One lawyer interviewed for this project stated that “lawyers have this blind faith in the system. 
The offenders have no faith in the system. They must feel that their Blackness put them in this 
situation then why would they want to highlight it.”362 Her opinion seems to align with the ex-
offenders’ perception around introducing race in sentencing. It is unclear if defence lawyers are 
aware of this reluctance. One defence lawyer even remarked that he must work a lot harder for 
his Black clients; therefore, he welcomes any tool that will make this job easier.363 It is 
questionably if IRCARs/CIARs can make the job of defence lawyers easier. Put another way, 
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does emphasizing race serve to make race-based litigation or sentencing easier or fairer? There is 
reason to suspect that an inordinate amount of attention on race may ‘back-fire’ and produce 
unanticipated results. Does this mean, however, that race should be sidelined in sentencing 
hearings given the inherent risks associated with its mobilization? This question will be 
discussed in more detail below. However, suffice it to say, if race is mobilized at sentencing, 
then it should be done in a principled fashion in light of this approach’s pitfalls and promises. 
When race is coopted as a convenient way to explain a phenomenon, or proffered as the sole unit 
for legal analysis, we risk essentializing the Black experience. These same questions and issues 
play out when lawyers consider spotlighting race in the context of Charter challenges. 
Section B: The Paradox of Invisibility (Race and the Charter) 
 
The paradox of visibility has played out in other contexts, apart from sentencing – most 
notably in the framing of Charter challenges.364Defence lawyers rarely mobilize race in cases 
dealing with anti-Black policing.365This approach is problematic because a failure to cite race 
and anti-Black bias during the guilt phase, including via Charter challenges and in evidence voir 
dires, leaves anti-Black racism to be dealt with on the back end.366It is widely accepted that the 
overcriminalization of Black Canadians leads to disparity in Black incarceration rates. Despite 
this recognition, anti-Black policing practices, for instance carding, pretext stops, overcharging, 
unreasonable searches, and arbitrary detentions, continue to result in a high number of 
prosecutions.367It is, however, rarely the case that defence counsel will challenge the police’s 
misconduct, and if challenged it is rarely accepted by the court.  Despite the reluctance from the 
criminal bar and the Bench, Professor Tanovich has been calling for years for courts and lawyers 
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to recognize the importance of mobilizing race in criminal litigation.368However, there have been 
some notable successes, most recently in Le.  Le is a departure from previous jurisprudence that 
has avoided looking race in the eye and has maintained what Tanovich describes as the 
“whiteness of the Charter.”369  
In Le, the police unlawfully detained and carded five racialized young men, four Black 
and one Asian, in the backyard of a housing unit in a low–income area of Toronto. The Asian 
male ran when he asked about the contents of a bag he was carrying and was chased by the 
police. When he was apprehended and subsequently searched, the police discovered a loaded 
handgun, drugs and money in the bag. The accused was convicted at trial. His conviction was 
upheld on appeal. The matter proceeded to the Supreme Court of Canada. A majority of the 
Court overturned the conviction and entered acquittals. Writing for the majority in a 3-2 split, 
Martin and Brown JJ. held that the police arbitrarily detained the applicant in breach of his 
section 9 Charter right. The majority excluded the evidence under subsection 24 (2) of the 
Charter as its admission would bring the administration of justice into disrepute. The majority 
found that the accused was detained from the moment the police officers entered the backyard. 
The majority’s section 9 analysis focused on how those individuals’ lived experiences as 
racialized men would inform their experience of police interactions, and must, therefore, be 
central to the detention analysis.370They also emphasized the importance of incorporating race in 
the detention analysis, particularly given the rise of carding and other racially biased policing 
strategies.371  
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Le provides critical race lawyers, concerned with combating anti-Black policing, with an 
opportunity and a guide to the appropriate mobilization of Blackness/race under section 9 of the 
Charter. Race is no longer to be rendered silent or marginalized when making a claim of 
arbitrary detention or unlawful arrest by law enforcement; indeed, if race is implicated, it is to be 
made a central part of the detention analysis. Le represents a subtle but significant shift in the 
Court’s detention analysis. Arguably, the Court incorporated a more intersectional approach in 
the section 9 analysis and in so doing, validated the subjective perspectives of racialized people. 
However, while the chill on race talk within the section 9 framework is now partially thawed, 
defence lawyers must avoid mobilizing race simply because the Court has given its blessing. The 
concern is that the uncoordinated and unprincipled use of Le may yield unintended results, for 
instance, indictments for playing the so-called “race card,”372which may ultimately serve to 
water down the precedential efficacy of the decision. However, if deployed conscientiously but 
unapologetically, the reasoning in Le has the potential to advance racial equality in Canada. The 
foregoing begs the question: will the Le majority’s lifting of the judicial embargo on race-based 
Charter litigation have any impact on how judges address race in sentencing? It is not being 
suggested that the Court’s acknowledgment of the role that race plays in the detention analysis is 
analogous to how race should be deployed in sentencing. For example, outside of the sentencing 
arena, a successful race-based argument may lead to the exclusion of evidence, removal of 
biased jurors, striking down offensive legislation and even Charter damages. What is the 
remedial value, however, in expounding and mobilizing Blackness at a sentencing hearing? 
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Section C: Achieving Sentencing Reform with IRCARs/CIARS (Potential and Pitfalls) 
 
A pitfall of mobilizing race at sentencing via IRCARs/CIARs is the possibility that such 
an approach may diminish the social and political realities of Blackness.  For example, Blackness 
may be disembodied from how it is socially and politically produced, which can compound 
existing structural violence. Blackness is a “product of social thought and relations. Not 
objective, inherent, or fixed, they correspond to no biological or genetic reality: rather, races are 
categories that society invents, manipulates, or retires when convenient”.373There is a concern 
that the narratives that are highlighted in IRCARs/CIARs may inadvertently pathologize 
Blackness. By emphasizing the traumatic ways in which Blackness impacts Black Canadians, 
and offenders, in particular, may serve to convert IRCARs/CIARS into a pseudo-mental health 
style report.374Such a report may provide credence to outmoded notions of Black peoples’ 
dangerous dispositions and mental fragility. As Anthony Peterson aptly remarked: “any mention 
of race will necessarily involve heroes and villains, angels and demons, winners and losers.”375 
Race talk is value-laden. While “race is not real, it matters."376 
There is a general resistance by judges to permit any explicit discussion of race during 
the criminal process, both at the guilt phase and at sentencing. What does this mean for lawyers 
who seek to mobilize race at sentencing? In one sense, defence lawyers who seek to use 
IRCARs/CIARs to explicitly discuss race at the sentencing phase are presenting race in a 
formulaic fashion at a late stage of the proceedings, oftentimes after eliding race talk throughout 
the trial phase. Such an approach may result in an over-exaggeration of race as a means of 
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correcting or to compensate for its erasure at other junctures. However, as it has been expressly 
recognized in the Gladue context that sentencing cannot be a panacea for Indigenous 
overrepresentation377, the same is correct for Black overrepresentation.378It is unlikely that 
systemic anti-Black racism will be eliminated by focusing exclusively on sentencing. However, 
to the extent that sentencing can be part of the solution, it raises the aforementioned paradox – 
does focusing on Blackness promote more merciful/proportionate sentences? Alternatively, does 
it pose the risk of backfiring insofar as it may increase the judge’s sense of the offender’s 
dangerousness, irretrievability, etc.? Moreover, will it irritate judges and the public, who may 
resist the implication that they are biased or accuse lawyers and offenders of “playing the race 
card”? 
Section D: Blackness and Criminal Sentencing (Unlikely Counterparts) 
 
When Blackness is mobilized as a potential mitigating factor, can it lead a more 
proportionate sentence? Moreover, if it can, how does it accomplish this task? To truly ‘know’ 
Blackness requires taking a journey through the Black experience, which may necessitate the 
temporary suspension of privilege. Can this journey be facilitated and guided with an 
IRCA/CIAR or through judicial notice? Alternatively, does it require a communitarian approach 
that compels the offender to embrace the impact of his crime on the integrity of the 
community?379For example, the Black community could demonstrate to the judge, the offender 
and the broader public, how the offender’s actions further complicated the already complicated 
journey that is Blackness. On this account, an IRCAR/CIAR should provide the judge with a 
map to guide him/her along their journey through Blackness. It could help him/her avoid certain 
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stereotypical pitfalls or, worse, determinism. The journey may provide the judge with a link 
between Blackness as a general experience, and how Blackness acted upon the specific offender.  
Blackness is dynamic and thus, no two African Canadians necessarily experience it in the 
same manner, which presents a challenge when there is an over-reliance on IRCARs/CIARS. 
These reports may inadvertently package the Black experience and thereby reduce it to a 
monolithic experience that is experienced similarly by all Black Canadians. A judge may be led 
to believe that a Jamaican born offender experiences Blackness similar to his Ghanaian 
counterpart. For example, while: 
Toronto’s youth violence wears the face of the Black youth as the primary target of 
racism…..just below the surface of this generic Black youth sits the Jamaicanization of 
crime. The discourse about the generic Black criminal in effect points to the Jamaican as 
the criminal. Likewise, other studies contest the homogenization of Blacks, highlighting 
how each Black group experiences and responds to violence differently. As we witness 
the shift from the Jamaicanization to Africanization of crime, we realize that anti-African-
Black racism is also a space marked by heterogeneity. Each African group experiences it 
differently. The newest face is the Somalization of crime.380 
 
There do exist certain common realities that are experienced by all Black Canadians, despite 
their cultural or geographic differences. For example, anti-Black racial profiling by the police is 
conducted with little concern about whether the suspect is Ghanaian or Jamaican. It is the 
offender’s skin colour that attracts unwanted scrutiny. However, at the Borders, this may not be 
the case. A Jamaican passenger may attract secondary inspection due to the prevailing stereotype 
that Jamaicans, particularly Black Jamaican females, are suspected drug mules.381Thus, 
IRCAR/CIAR writers must be mindful that they do not essentialize the experiences of Black 
peoples through the presentation of a solitary Black narrative that may be alien to large sections 
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of the Black community.382In some cases, pervasive myths and attitudes about Blackness may 
serve to override the information contained in a CIARS/IRCARS, which is due in part to the fact 
that the criminal justice system is not race-neutral or colour blind.  
Moreover, to the extent that we are talking about reforms centred on the use of 
IRCARs/CIARs, we must acknowledge that this approach is not a “no-cost” or “low-cost” 
proposition for the individuals and communities they seek to benefit. Arguably, their production 
is potentially (re)traumatizing. The narratives, in the CIARs/IRCARs reviewed for this project, 
are not exclusive to the offenders, adducing them in to evidence before sentencing courts. It is a 
collective narrative that uses, and interpretation will reverberate outside of the courtroom. 
Blackness is often manipulated by both lawyers and clients to get the best sentence outcome 
possible. One defence lawyer even remarked that “my goal is to use these reports to get the best 
deal for my client.”383Another lawyer stated that “given the judicial resistance to talking about 
race we must infuse the system with a sense that these are issue that must be grappled 
with.”384As discussed above, the concept of Blackness is malleable and is prone to distortion. 
The picture of Blackness that is sometimes presented to sentencing judges via IRCARs/CIARs 
often aligns with many of the pernicious stereotypes that socially disadvantage Black Canadians. 
Thus, if used in an unprincipled fashion, these reports may solidify prevailing presuppositions 
about Blackness. It is questionable if a slight numerical reduction in an offender’s sentence is 
worth the social impact this kind of strategy will have on Black communities.  
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Like Gladue reports, IRCARs/CIARs seek to contextualize blameworthiness insofar as 
IRCAR/CIAR writers must paint a portrait of Blackness and its connections to the offence and 
the offender. However, within this portrait are the images of countless individuals that are caught 
in the same orbit as the offender – thus, their lives are also the subject, albeit inadvertently, of 
review. An analysis of the offender becomes an analysis of the entire group. For example, even 
though Blackness does not affect all Black people equally when Blackness is essentialized for 
judicial convenience, the portrait purports to tell the story of an entire race. This approach can 
have detrimental consequences for the broader Black community that assiduously toil to sever 
the linkages between Blackness and crime. The offender’s Black experience is informed by 
various forces that have resulted in his or her offending behaviour. It is not merely a reaction to 
the oppression that Black people experience in common, i.e. racial profiling, carding, streaming. 
There is, arguably, no linear or causal trajectory between anti-Black racism/Blackness and 
criminality. Such a theory is a limited and intellectually lazy way of understanding the impacts of 
anti-Blackness. 
IRCARs/CIARS are designed to erect an evidentiary causeway to link the background or 
systemic factors pertinent to the offender and the offence. These reports require an offender to 
disclose information about the many ways in which he has experience structural violence. These 
stories are traumatic and may serve to re-traumatize the individual. Thus, the writing, collection 
and dissemination of the information in these reports must be trauma-informed. The offender is 
made to detail how his Blackness informed and constrained his choices. A positive 
acknowledgment may provide a cathartic relief – a sense of validation and vindication, whereas 
an adverse treatment may compound the layers of mistrust and antipathy that many Black 
Canadians have towards the criminal justice system. Therefore, sentencing reform - and 
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especially sentencing reform involving the use of IRCARs/CIARs - can only be justified if its 
positive material impacts on Black communities and individuals outweigh its costs. Furthermore, 
the question of whether sentencing reform (including the expanded use of IRCARs/CIARs) can 
have any significant positive material impact is an open one, given the intrinsic conservativeness 
of sentencing reform.  
In assessing whether sentencing reform (expanded use of IRCARs/CIARs) can have a 
sufficiently positive impact to justify its use, despite its costs, it is helpful to think about 
sentencing in both quantitative and qualitative terms. The former requires an analysis of sentence 
reduction, in terms of time (quantitative), and the corresponding impact that this may have on the 
broader Black community. For example, is a slight reduction in time, in the numerical sense, 
worth the potential trauma faced by not only the offender but the Black community? The 
IRCAR/CIAR sentencing decisions reviewed for this thesis, except for Morris, revealed that the 
numerical reduction in sentences was negligible and tended to fit within existing sentencing 
ranges. Moreover, in those cases where the sentence was fixed by law, the parole ineligibility 
period was generally a judicial attempt at “splitting the difference” between the defence and 
Crown’s request. The problem is not the with the efficacy of IRCARs/CIARs per se, rather the 
fact that they are designed to work within the paradigm of proportionality, and a system that 
measures punishment severity in quantitative terms. The impact of these reports in youth cases is 
are more potent. In all cases, the sentencing judge refused the Crown’s application to sentence 
the offender as an adult. These results, however, are not solely a consequence of the introduction 
of IRCARs/CIARs; instead, they are due to an application of the principle of reduced 
blameworthiness that is enshrined in the YCJA. The reports instead provided the judges with rich 
background information that assisted them in contextualizing the offender and the offence.  
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A qualitative change may relate to restorative justice principles.385It might also 
correspond, analogously, with the Gladue approach, which seeks to advance more culturally-
appropriate sentencing responses (qualitative) in addition to reducing over-incarceration 
(quantitative); though here, one must be mindful about the distinctiveness of Gladue, and the 
unique relationship between Indigenous peoples and the State. In particular, a qualitative shift 
could place the focus more squarely on rehabilitation and reintegration, and away from a focus 
on crime reduction through incapacitation and deterrence. Crucially, such a shift would not 
necessarily compromise the goals of crime reduction, which are not well served by the current 
system. For instance, there is currently a serious gun and drug problem in some Black 
communities across Canada, particularly in Toronto. This problem is not easily remedied as it is 
rooted in a long history of structural violence against Black Canadians.386Thus, a theory of 
sentencing that supports using a victim of structural racism as a tool for curbing the very 
conditions it is instrumental in creating is problematic and reinforces structural violence against 
Black Canadians. To manipulate and use the product of anti-Blackness (the offender and his 
sentence) to combat the impact of anti-Blackness (the reason why the offender is before the 
court) does not prevent crime. In this regard, general deterrence deflects responsibility from the 
State to the offender and his community for issues that are not solely their creation. It is unlikely 
that IRCARs/CIARs alone can promote a shift away from general deterrence. Arguably, a shift 
away from general deterrence would require a more radical change in sentencing policy, as it 
would likely require a formal change to the Criminal Code and not just a new interpretation of 
the existing statutory provisions.   
                                                          
385 See generally, supra note 376. 
386 Akwatu Khenti, supra note at 190. 
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From a qualitative standpoint, a sentencing judge must consider whether the offender is 
being sentenced in a culturally salient manner. For example, are there relevant cultural 
programming at the institution where he will be incarcerated or should the court use community-
based alternatives for sentencing. In the Gladue context, for a sentence to be just, it must 
consider the cultural needs of the offender. As Court explained in Gladue: 
it is often the case that neither aboriginal offenders nor their communities are well served 
by incarcerating offenders, particularly for less serious or non-violent offences.  Where 
these sanctions are reasonable in the circumstances, they should be implemented.  In all 
instances, it is appropriate to attempt to craft the sentencing process and the sanctions 
imposed in accordance with the aboriginal perspective.387 
 
Similar considerations should be had in the case of Black offenders. The Black experience, 
despite its diversity, share one thing in common – oppression. While this oppression is 
experienced in different ways, it results in collective trauma. A sentencing decision can either 
ameliorate or aggravate that trauma. As Duff argues, the institution of criminal sentencing serves 
a communicative function.388A sentence can convey messages of censure or restoration. For 
instance, an overly harsh sentence may signal a strong message of censure, whereas a lenient one 
may transmit compassion or mercy. Thus, it is critical that judges strongly consider the 
communicative and didactic effects of their sentencing decisions. 
 Black offenders may, however, embody both the role of victim and offender, making it 
critical for a sentencing judge to consider what communicative impact the sentence will have on 
the offender and his community. There is no reason to believe that Black Canadians do not share 
the same retributive impulse as many other non-Black Canadians.389Unlike Indigenous peoples, 
there is no evidence to suggest that Black peoples have “different conceptions of criminal justice 
                                                          
387 Supra note 237 at 74. 
388 See generally, R.A. Duff, Trials and Punishments, supra note 19. 
389 See for eg. Oladele Abiodun Balogun, “A Philosophical Defence of Punishment in Traditional African Legal 
Culture: The Yoruba Example” (2009) 3:3 The Journal of Pan African Studies 43. 
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and of appropriate criminal sanctions.”390There are, however, pressing social issues in Black 
communities across Canada. Judges should be empowered to take judicial notice of this fact or 
other compelling social context evidence, in contextualizing, and in some cases, attenuating 
moral blameworthiness.391IRCARs/CIARs can be deployed as a tool for restoring broken social 
bonds and also as a means of edifying judges, crowns and defence lawyers about the impact that 
criminal sentencing continues to have on Black communities.392A restorative justice approach 
may prioritize healing broken social bonds and repairing the diabolic image of Blackness that is 
pervasive in Canada. As the Court held in R v Nasogaluak, “a proportionate sentence is one that 
expresses, to some extent, society’s legitimate shared values and concerns.”393 
Outside of Nova Scotia, IRCARs/CIARs have not attracted sufficient judicial buy-in. 
Indeed, the Jackson/Morris methodology has not garnered the widespread support needed to 
correct, or at the very least critically redress, the plight facing Black offenders in the criminal 
justice system. Given the inherent pitfalls associated with combating anti-Black racism via 
sentence reform, it may be sensible to direct the community’s limited political/social/economic 
capital on other potential targets. However, sentencing is a site of immense structural violence 
and is thereby is an appropriate platform to address anti-Blackness. Bias at the sentencing phase 
results in harsher sentences for similarly-situated Black offenders, thereby exacerbating the 
problem of over-incarceration. Despite this fact, almost no work has been done on the question 
of how we might promote an anti-racist agenda through criminal sentencing. Not simply by 
treating Blackness as something that is implicitly or unconsciously, and unjustly, aggravating; 
but on explicitly attending to it as a potential mitigating factor. The Jackson/Morris framework 
                                                          
390 Supra note 237 at 21. 
391 Barbara A Hudson, supra note 28. 
392 Supra note 376. 
393 2010 SCC 6, [2010] 1 S.C.R. 206 at 49. 
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provides a jurisprudential basis, albeit flimsy, for addressing Blackness in the sentencing process 
by grounding the Black experience in the proportionality analysis. It does so by examining how 
the offender’s experience through Blackness connects to the crime and the offender’s personal 
responsibility. 
Blackness is complex factor that is often overlooked by judges. It may, however, be 
challenging to precisely understand what must be done with Blackness in order to redress or 
address structural violence. This issue has recently come to the forefront of race-based Charter 
litigation but has received minimal consideration in the sentencing context. It is accepted that 
anti-Blackness may result in over-policing, but does it render the offender less culpable? Some 
of the Black ex-offenders interviewed for this study, perceived their Blackness as a form of 
restraint in how they conduct their daily lives. The IRCAR writer interviewed for this project, 
also remarked that Black people’s choices are constrained due to anti-Black racism. When asked 
to explain her observation, she commented that “Black people are punished for simply trying to 
survive the conditions created by anti-Black racism.”394The decision to engage in criminality is 
thus not a voluntary act per se, but rather one that is the by-product of structural racism. In a 
sense, a Black offender may embody two positions - victim and offender. He is the victim of a 
cruel system that simultaneously shapes and curtail his choices. The Blackness that he 
experiences is not of his own construction. He inherited it along with all the consequences that 
flow from that condition.395 
                                                          
394 C.S. is social worker and assistant professor. This is a direct quote. See also, Paul Butler, supra note 50. 
395 For many, it is nearly impossible to alter this condition or as Irene Watson, an Australian Indigenous scholar 
remarked get from under the “table cloth” of the oppressor to rediscover, reaffirm and revitalize who they are.  
Indeed, similar to the plight of Indigenous peoples, in both Canada and Australia, Black Canadians are laden down 
with the invidious and pernicious legacies and ongoing atrocities of white supremacy. Arguably, white supremacy 
continues to gain ground partly, through what scholars refer to as social death. Social death is a symptom of 
colonialism, and slavery. To truly destroy a people, it is necessary to snuff out the very ‘thing’ that bids life.  For 
Watson, key to this life force for Australian Indigenous peoples is Ruwe (the ‘Land’). However, as a consequence of 
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Anti-Blackness does not only destroy Black bodies but is instrumental in the wholesale 
destruction of communities. Akwasi Owusu-Bempah asserts that: 
what little research that exists concerning Black Canadian offenders indicates they are 
over-represented among homicide offenders in some urban areas such as Toronto. Survey 
data from Toronto indicate Black Canadian youth may be somewhat more involved with 
violence such as assaults than other racial groups.396 
 
 Indeed, all the cases reviewed for this thesis involved Black men engaged in violent behaviour. 
While there is no statistical or biological correlation between Blackness and crime, these cases 
may imply otherwise. In some sense, the use of IRCARs/CIARS may lead to a situation where 
an offender’s Blackness is highlighted in cases involving crimes that are often associated with 
Black criminality. Thus, creating an association that is a contributing factor to the racism that 
leads to over-representation and necessitates the use of CIARs/IRCARs in the first place. 
However, as mentioned above, in some situations, the offender is also victimized, which 
assumes that society ought to bear some of the responsibility for the offender’s actions. Such a 
characterization of victimhood may serve to diminish the seriousness of the crime committed and 
the justice that the victim and the wider public deserves. In R v “X”, for example, the young 
person shot his cousin in the stomach with a hunting rifle. In Gabriel, the offender shot and 
killed his cousin. In both cases both the victims and the offenders were Black, and the offence 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
the colonial project Indigenous peoples are increasingly being disconnected from Ruwe, and thereby themselves. 
Watson asserts that her connection to Ruwe was not extinguished by the colonial wave. She declares: “I remain who 
I am, beneath the layers of invasion, colonisation and rape”. Nonetheless, despite Watson’s defiant and resistive 
declaration she asserts that the “process of colonialism in the end become self-colonising”. She makes that remark in 
the context of the conspicuous manner in which the colonial project is being furthered by Indigenous Peoples. The 
same can be said in the Canadian context. In her seminal work on sexual violence in Indigenous communities, 
Hadley Friedland discusses the high level of sexual crime in Indigenous communities and the existential crisis being 
faced by their denizens in how to address these violent issues in a cultural appropriate manner. Black Canadians 
similarly struggle with self-enslavement/colonization in their own fight for emancipation. As reggae icon Bob 
Marley once remarked “emancipate yourself from mental slavery, for none but ourselves can free our mind”. It is 
within the minds and souls of Black peoples that there exist the new frontier of slavery and anti-Black racism. As 
Franz Fanon asserted, “it is all too true that the major responsibility for this racialization of thought, or at least the 
way it is applied, lies with the Europeans who have never stopped placing white culture in opposition to the other 
noncultures.”  
396Akwasi Owusu-Bempah, supra note 6 at 78. 
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involved the violent use of a firearm. The CIARs in both cases provided the respective 
sentencing judge with a veritable blizzard of social context and background information about 
both offenders. This information may shed light on the circumstances that precipitated the 
offence and explicate the moral blameworthiness of the offender. However, and as held in 
Ipeelee, this background information should “not operate as an excuse or justification for an 
offence.”397It is not being suggested that the intended purpose of IRCARs/CIARs is to provide a 
race-based excuse or justification for the offending behaviour of a Black Canadian. Any 
approach to sentencing that seeks to package or essentialize Blackness to explain a Black 
offender’s actions is fundamentally flawed. Such an approach would be an affront to dignity and 
serve to support a deterministic theory of crime.398 
There is an issue with highlighting an offender’s Blackness/race in order to prevent unfair 
attention to his race/Blackness. As discussed earlier, the criminal justice system is instrumental 
in constructing certain ‘truths’ about race and crime, which may unconsciously lead to the 
conjuring of a particular suspect profile. This is in large part due to how our system of criminal 
justice brands criminality. Over-emphasizing Blackness at sentencing may result in the 
offender’s race being placed on trial. Sentencing judges may feel the need to determine if the 
offender’s particular brand of Blackness is causally linked to the offence. There are no 
inexorable links between Blackness and crime, aside from those that are constructed through 
anti-Blackness. Unfortunately, these links are not merely the product of racists, but may also 
come from within the Black community. One ex-offender interviewee stated that “there is a link 
between Blackness and crime, especially when it comes to drugs and guns.”399 
                                                          
397 Supra note 29 at 83. 
398 See generally, Farah Focquaert, Andrea Glenn and Adrian Raine, “Free Will, Responsibility, and the Punishment 
of Criminals” in Thomas A. Nadelhoffer, The Future of Punishment (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013). 
399 S.L. is Black female ex-offeder. This is a direct quote. 
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 I found in my own experience that whenever police me, they always asked if I had a gun 
or any drugs on me. The constant bombardment from the media, police, and community 
members and even in our jurisprudence about the linkages between Blackness and violent 
crimes, i.e. guns and drugs, serves to reinforce already entrenched notions about Black 
criminality and dangerousness. It is against this backdrop that Black bodies are sentenced. Thus, 
an overemphasizing of Blackness, albeit in an effort to attenuate these linkages, may actually 
serve to amplify an already entrenched issue. Most of the ex-offenders expressed reluctance in 
raising their race during sentencing because they believe that they should be judged based on 
other factors, i.e. the offence. A majority of them stated that they only wanted to be treated as a 
white offender. One ex-offender commented that “it should be what you did not your race that 
should be considered.”400Another one explained that “if you commit a crime, then it should not 
matter the race and culture of the person.”401It would appear that they desired a sentencing 
regime that was race-neutral and colour-blind. One that focused less on their race, and more on 
the offence. Their aspiration is puzzling given that in many cases, the offence is a result of anti-
Black racism and other forms of structural violence.  
Sentencing reform, however, is not a panacea for the problem of the over-criminalization 
and mass incarceration of Black Canadians, and the broader problem of anti-Black racism. 
Moreover, criminal sentencing is one point along a continuum of structurally violent 
mechanisms targeting Black bodies. Indeed, the over-incarceration of Black Canadians is 
systemic in scope and is supported and sustained through various institutions. Thus, criminal 
sentencing may be a poor platform to address and remedy a social issue of this magnitude. 
                                                          
400 M.J. is a 38-year-old male Black ex-offender. This is a paraphrased from the orginal comment for clarity and 
grammatical correctness. 
401 M.W. is a 38-year-old Black male ex-offender. This is a direct quote. 
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Moreover, the over-incarceration of Black bodies also relates to the general problem of anti-
Black racism and the ways in which it infects the criminal justice system. Arguably, there is 
some danger in seeking sentencing reform via IRCARS/CIARS, given that racism is an ordinary, 
common and intractable feature of the criminal justice system.402Thus, sentencing reform may 
not be considered a workable solution to the problem of the over-criminalization and over-
incarceration of Black bodies and the broader problem of anti-Black racism. There is a concern 
that seeking change in such a hostile system is undesirable or, worse, impossible. This form of 
nihilism is a tenet of the structural determinism thesis, which explains that “the idea that our 
system, by reason of its structure and vocabulary, cannot redress certain types of wrong.”403 
However, CRT scholars assert that innovation is key to law reform.404It is well 
established that one of the primary causes of Black over-incarceration is the fact that Black 
offenders often receive disproportionately higher criminal penalties compared to their similarly-
situated white counterparts; and as such, one goal of progressive criminal justice reform should 
be the promotion and facilitation of proportionate sentences for African Canadians. 
IRCARs/CIARs are designed to highlight specific cultural, social, and political mitigating factors 
that ought to be considered in the sentencing of African Canadian offenders, which raises the 
following concern, namely: can CIARs/IRCARs be salutatory in the context of our current 
sentencing regime? There is an activist dimension to the CIARs/IRCARS movement, insofar as 
proponents seek to use them to transform the current sentencing regime. From a CRT perspective 
this form of resistance is laudable. CRT scholars/activist “not only tries to understand our social 
                                                          
402Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, supra note 39 at 7. 
403Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, supra note 39 at 26. 
404Ibid. 
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situation but to change it: it sets out not only to ascertain how society organizes itself along racial 
lines and hierarchies but to transform it for the better.” 405 
In Morris, Justice Nakatsuru, while considering the role that leniency ought to play in the 
sentencing of Black bodies explained the following:  
[83]           But let me be real for a moment. The new charges does mean that 
there are grounds to believe that your time while on bail on these charges have not gone 
smoothly.  Some may question why I am giving you leniency. For a 15-month sentence is 
a lenient sentence.  Some may argue that you are not worthy.  That you have failings.  
That you have not yet shown to have turned your life around. 
 
[84]           In my opinion, we have to get past this idea of waiting for the perfect 
person to be lenient. Waiting for the most benevolent soul by the standards of the 
privileged and the few, before we decide to extend consideration for leniency.  For we 
may be waiting a long time.  The young man who makes the choice to pick up a loaded 
illegal handgun will not likely be a product of a private school upbringing who has the 
security of falling back upon upper middle class family resources.  Rather, he is likely to 
be a product of oppression, despair, and disadvantage. Likely he is someone who cannot 
turn his life around on a dime even if he wanted to. In short, he is you, Mr. Morris. 
 
[85]  So in the final analysis, what makes this sentencing different from other 
cases where leniency was not given is that I have been given a wealth of information to 
sentence you.  Information that can be used to take further steps to deal with the over-
incarceration of Black people in this country.406 
 
Justice Nakatsuru does not cite any precedent or authority for his analysis, except for the 
information he received via the IRCAR and his own judicial notice of the plight faced by the 
accused and members of his community. However, there is a concern that the Court of Appeal 
may mistakenly construe IRCARs as a sophisticated (and expensive - not just in terms of money, 
but the psychological burden placed on the offender and his/her community) plea for mercy and 
not as a tool of mitigation within a proportionality-based sentencing regime. Mr. Morris is the 
proverbial poster boy, which is supported by ample empirical sources for a significant subsection 
of the Black community. As the court noted, Mr. Morris is the product of oppression, despair, 
                                                          
405Ibid at 3. 
406Morris, supra note 279 at 83-85. 
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and disadvantage.  He embodies the unenviable qualities that beset a majority of the thousands of 
Black men that are funnelled through the criminal justice system each year. Therefore, it is 
questionable whether mercy, even as a countervailing concept, to correct a bona fide social 
wrong, is what the Black community, whose collective backs IRCARs/CIARs sit atop, is a 
worthwhile objective to pursue. In this context, mercy requires a plea to the conscience, 
compassion and magnanimity of the presiding jurist. It seems to require a dereliction of his/her 
judicial duty in advancement of racial justice.407 Mercy, however, may not simply be a plea to 
the benevolence of sentencing judge. 
Given that our system of criminal justice is skewed towards the over-punishment of 
racialized offenders, some scholars have advocated for the introduction of mercy into criminal 
sentencing as a means of correcting for this “punitive turn.”408CIARs/IRCARs are designed to 
alert judges to mitigating factors that should properly inform a proportionate sentence, and is 
thus consistent with a retributivist system. On this account, giving someone a lower sentence in 
light of a CIAR/IRCAR is not merciful; the sentence is proportionate given the lower level of 
blameworthiness evinced by the CIAR/IRCAR, and thus the sentence is appropriate from a 
retributivist perspective. Alternatively, one could argue that a CIAR/IRCAR is designed to 
                                                          
407 As discussed above, I was once the recipient of white judicial compassion. I am not sure if my race or age played 
a role in the judge’s decision, but one thing was clear – my life was in that judge’s hands. His decision prompted me 
to begin to seriously consider the path that I was on. Did I deserve leniency? In my mind, I didn’t believe so. I 
thought that I was too far gone. I had been warned plenty of times before by judges, Crowns, police officers, family 
and friends to give up my lifestyle. However, none of them provided me with a suitable alternative. I was 23-year-
old father of 4 children who had dropped out of high school and sold drugs to make a living. My life was eerily 
similar to all of the offenders in the cases that I reviewed for this thesis, and the ex-offenders I interviuewed. All of 
my friends and some of my male family members were involved in street-level criminality. Many had criminal 
records, and some were deported or going through deportation proceedings. Even my older brother and two of our 
friends were charged with 1st-degree murder. It was within this environment that I discovered a different notion of 
Blackness. Like Messrs. Morris and Jackson, owning a gun was a requirement. Indeed, on two occasions when I was 
arrested there was a gun in the car. Never on my person, however. So, whenever I appeared before a judge, I 
expected the worse because my life was surrounded by disappointments. Therefore, the last person I expected to 
seek salvation or compassion from was the person that embodied all the reasons that caused my situation.  
408Carol Steiker, “The Mercy Seat: Discretion, Justice, and Mercy in the American Criminal Justice System”, supra 
note 222 at 222; Carol Steiker, “Criminalization and the Criminal Process: Prudential Mercy as a Limit on Penal 
Sanctions in an Era of Mass Incarceration”, supra note 226. 
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promote a more empathetic, holistic, merciful sentencing process that treats criminal sentencing 
as a site for countering or counter-balancing anti-Black racism in society and the criminal justice 
process. This latter claim might lead us to say: the proposed sentence is disproportionately low 
but is justified by countervailing considerations. However, it is often argued that mercy is 
incompatible with justice and thus has no place in criminal sentencing. For example, one may 
perceive mercy as undesirable, given that it necessarily involves the performance of power 
differentials, whereby an empowered individual chooses to extend a benefit to which the 
disempowered individual has no right to claim, and is expected to receive in a spirit of gratitude.  
This conceptualization of mercy seems to track with notions of degradation and serves as an 
affront to human dignity. The following quote nicely summarizes the potential of deploying 
mercy as a public value in Canadian sentencing law: 
the place of mercy in Canadian penal justice is little developed in our jurisprudence. 
There is a deep uncertainty whether mercy can be accommodated within the positive law 
of sentencing or recognised only as an exceptional reason to depart from the ordinary 
principles of the positive law that would apply in a given case.  In a narrower form mercy 
is apparent in some notions of mitigation for personal hardship. It may be seen also in 
decisions that seek to redress deprivations that would be cruel or pointless. But, in a 
broader sense, perhaps the most fertile ground for mercy is where the lawful power of 
courts can be used to allow hope to flourish if there is a chance of success.  If there is 
such a chance, it may be argued that mercy provides a sufficient reason to depart from the 
path that would otherwise be dictated by retributive objectives within the positive law of 
sentencing.409  
 
There is value in mercy, especially in situations where mercy tempers the mad fervour to punish 
without due consideration for structural violence. Mercy does not track with degradation if it is 
conceptualized as a bilateral grant; rather than the performance of power differentials.  
IRCARs/CIARs can facilitate and promote a two-way flow of mercy wherein power relations are 
flattened, and dignity is made a central consideration in sentencing determinations. The proposed 
approach imagines a situation whereby the State seeks mercy from Black Canadians by 
                                                          
409 R v Zaher, 2017 ONSC 582 (CanLII) aff’d R v Zaher, 2019 ONCA 59 (CanLII) at para 13. 
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providing quantitatively and qualitatively better sentences for Black offenders, and in turn, a 
Black offender may feel morally emancipated when he or she makes a plea for mercy. Such an 
approach can be considered as a shared grant of mercy. One in which both parties, the State and 
Black offenders, seek and grant mercy. This approach is a dignity affirming compromise. It is 
not about compensating for past wrongs; instead, it serves as the repatriation of stolen/lost 
dignity. 
Conclusion 
  
In the end, IRCARs/CIARS may be a call for mercy, not as a sovereign grant, but as a 
recognition of the cruelty that often ensues when mercy is eschewed. Perhaps the connotations 
that generally travel with the concept of mercy is unfortunate. However, when conceptualized as 
a mechanism that promotes hope and redresses social deprivations, one may argue that semantics 
are insignificant. As Justice Nakatsuru aptly remarked: “in my opinion, we have to get past this 
idea of waiting for the perfect person to be lenient. Waiting for the most benevolent soul by the 
standards of the privileged and the few, before we decide to extend consideration for leniency. 
For we may be waiting a long time.”410In a sense, CIARs/IRCARs invite sentencing judges to 
take a chance on a Black offender and in so doing, infuse his or her life with hope. There is no 
guarantee that the offender will not re-offend, but this is hardly a reason to deny them an 
opportunity that was conspicuously absent in his or her life.  
The judge in my sentencing hearing did not have the value of an IRCAR/CIAR, but as 
with so many Black men, my Blackness was difficult to conceal. Any attempt at concealing or 
erasing Blackness is futile. The fact that IRCARs/CIARs force judges and prosecutors to grapple 
with these issues, despite the inherent pitfalls, is a laudable step in combatting anti-Black racism 
                                                          
410Morris, supra note 279 at 84. 
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in criminal sentencing, and in the broader criminal justice system. Sentencing reform is at best, 
only a partial solution to the structural violence endured by Black Canadians. There is, however, 
a chance that by addressing anti-Blackness at a site where Black bodies are routinely degraded, 
we may force a more honest confrontation of Black over-incarceration. Ultimately, the more 
profound paradox of visibility may be this: in our society, there is a direct correlation between 
the impossibility of looking past Blackness, and the unwillingness to look at anti-Blackness. If 
looking more closely at Blackness makes it harder for the criminal justice system to look away 
from anti-Black racism, then we will have achieved an incomplete but not insignificant victory. 
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Appendices 
 
Appendix A: Sample Questions for Defence Lawyer Participants 
1. What do you consider to be the purpose(s) and/or objective(s) of sentencing? 
2. Are you usually satisfied that the sentence received is reasonable? If so, why? If not, 
why not? 
3. Are you concerned at times that factors such as race may affect the sentence given?  If 
so, why do you think so?   
4. Have you experienced what you would describe as unfair or unreasonable sentencing 
when representing non-white clients?  Can you elaborate by way of specific case 
experiences? 
5. Do you think that there is a relationship between race and crime? If so, can you explain 
why? 
6. In your view, should consideration(s) be given to an offender’s race when he/she is 
being sentenced? If so, why or why not? Explain what factors/issues should be taken 
into account for sentencing? 
7. Do you think that the historical and general mistreatment of African-Canadians affects 
the outcome when an individual member of that group is being sentenced for a crime 
he/she committed? 
8. Some argue that, in general, Aboriginal and Black offenders have been over-
incarcerated?  Do you have any thoughts on the over-incarceration of Aboriginal and 
Black offenders? 
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Appendix B: Sample Questions for non-Lawyer Participants 
 
1. Are you concerned at times that factors such as race may affect the sentence given?  
If so, why do you think so?   
2. In your view, should consideration(s) be given to an offender’s race when he/she is being 
sentenced? If so, why or why not? Explain what factors/issues should be taken into account 
for sentencing? 
3. Do you think that there is a relationship between race and crime? If so, can you explain 
why? 
 
 
 
 
 
